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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine, if you will, the following scenario:1 The defendant is
charged with the violent stabbing death of another. Testimony at trial
reveals that the defendant, who has been diagnosed as a chronic schiz-
ophrenic, suffers from frequent auditory and visual hallucinations.
He believes that he is a prophet of God and must defend himself
against demons, one of whom had taken over the body of the victim.
Despite his attorney's strenuous objection, the judge orders that the
* © 1986 Linda C. Fentiman.
** Associate Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School; B.S., 1970, Cornell
University; J.D., 1975, S.U.N.Y. at Buffalo Law School; LL.M., 1983, Harvard University
School of Law.
The author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of Suffolk University Law
School students Susan Anderson, Susan Atwater, Robin Olmstead Cain, and Christopher L.
Maclachlan.
1. This scenario is drawn from Commonwealth v. Louraine, 390 Mass. 28, 453 N.E.2d
437 (1983).
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defendant be tried while receiving heavy doses of Stelazine and other
antipsychotic medications.2 This medication, while controlling to
some extent the defendant's behavior and other overt symptoms of his
mental illness, also reduces the defendant's mental alertness and his
ability to concentrate, and dramatically changes his demeanor in front
of the jury. 3 At trial, the defendant concedes that he stabbed the vic-
tim, but asserts that he is not guilty by reason of insanity. The jury,
2. Antipsychotics are one of four major classes of psychotropic drugs; i.e., drugs used in
the treatment of mental illness. The others are the antidepressants (such as Tofranil and
Elavil), the antimania drugs (such as Lithium), and the anti-anxiety drugs (such as Librium
and Valium). See Eisenberg, Psychiatric Intervention, 229 Sci. AM. 116, 121-25 (1973);
Klerman, Psychotropic Drugs as Therapeutic Agents, 2 HASTINGS CENTER STUD. 81, 83-87
(1974). The antipsychotics, in turn, are broken into five major sub-groups: the
phenothiazines, whose most prominent member, chlorpromazine, is perhaps better known as
thorazine; the thioxanthines; the rauwolfia derivatives; the benzoquinolines; and the
butyrophenones. Klerman, supra, at 83-84. The effectiveness of these drugs in reducing the
most overt symptoms of mental illness was discovered through research which followed the
serendipitous finding by a French anaesthesiologist in 1951 that prospective surgical patients
whom he treated with chlorpromazine displayed little anxiety in regard to their pending
surgery although they were otherwise apparently alert and aware of their surroundings.
Haddox & Pollack, Psychopharmaceutical Restoration to Present Sanity (Mental Competency to
Stand Trial), 17 J. FORENSIC Sci. 568, 570 (1972).
Following the introduction of chlorpromazine into the United States in 1953,
psychiatrists made widespread use of both it and related phenothiazine compounds.
Physicians found the antipsychotic drugs to be tremendously useful in temporarily reducing or
eliminating the overt symptoms of psychosis, particularly schizophrenia, thus making it
possible for a number of patients to benefit from more traditional forms of psychotherapy. In
addition, drug therapy allowed large numbers of institutionalized mental patients to be
released outright from state mental hospitals. See Gutheil & Applebaum, "Mind Control,"
"Synthetic Sanity, " "Artificial Competence," and Genuine Confusion: Legally Relevant Effects
of Antipsychotic Medication, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 77, 100 (1983); Haddox, Gross, & Pollack,
Mental Competency to Stand Trial While Under the Influence of Drugs, 7 Loy. L.A.L. REV.
425, 448 n.138 (1974). The broad ranging use of antipsychotic and other psychotropic drugs
in the 1960's and 1970's, combined with an emerging patients' rights movement, occasioned
the phenomenon known as "deinstitutionalization"-the massive decrease in the number of
patients in state mental hospitals. The nationwide census in state institutions fell from a high
of 559,000 patients in 1955 to 132,000 patients in 1983. Lamb, Deinstitutionalization and the
Homeless Mentally Ill, in AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, TASK FORCE REPORT,
THE HOMELESS MENTALLY ILL (1984).
While psychotropic drug therapy has had a positive effect on the numbers of people
institutionalized due to mental illness, the drugs have been widely criticized. Critics allege that
physicians frequently overprescribe or otherwise improperly administer these drugs as a means
of permitting an inadequate staff to control a number of difficult and seriously disturbed
patients. Critics also argue that use of these drugs is accompanied by a number of
discomforting, extremely debilitating, and potentially irreversible side effects. See infra text
accompanying notes 115-20. This article will focus on these side effects to the extent that they
may impair an insane defendant's right to conduct and present a defense, and to the extent
they may impinge upon his constitutional and common law right to privacy and right to refuse
unwanted medical treatment.
3. Commonwealth v. Louraine, 390 Mass. 28, 32-33, 453 N.E.2d 437, 441 (1983).
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however, rejects his defense, and convicts the defendant of first degree
murder.
In a small but significant group of cases such as this one,4 the
defendant's constitutional right not to incriminate himself, to present
a defense to a criminal charge, and to privacy are on an apparent
collision course with the constitutional prohibition against the trial of
incompetent defendants. Where the defendant is a mentally ill indi-
vidual who may only be restored to competency through the use of
psychotropic drugs, the very fact of this pharmaceutical restoration
may significantly undercut his primary defense-that he was insane at
the time of the offense. The defendant's "synthetic sanity," achieved
through the taking of antipsychotics or other psychoactive drugs, pre-
cludes the jury from seeing the defendant as he was at the time of the
crime, the moment for which the jury's assessment of his mental state
is critical. The defendant's synthetic sanity may also interfere with
his ability to assist his counsel in mounting a defense by impairing his
cognitive functioning and diminishing his sense of trial reality to the
point that he loses his will to fight the charges against him.5 In addi-
tion, the state's insistence that the defendant stand trial while medi-
cated violates the fundamental fifth amendment principle that the
state must independently establish its case against the defendant,
rather than by forcing him to speak against himself. Finally, com-
4. For cases addressing the question of whether the state may compel a defendant who
raises a defense of insanity to take psychotropic medication, see Commonwealth v. Louraine,
390 Mass. 28, 453 N.E.2d 437 (1983); People v. Hardesty, 139 Mich. App. 124, 362 N.W.2d
787 (1984); State v. Hayes, 118 N.H. 458, 389 A.2d 1379 (1978); State v. Law, 270 S.C. 664,
244 S.E.2d 302 (1978); In re Pray, 133 Vt. 253, 336 A.2d 174 (1975); State v. Murphy, 56
Wash. 2d 761, 355 P.2d 323 (1960); State v. Maryott, 6 Wash. App. 96, 492 P.2d 239 (1971).
In Louraine, the Massachusetts Supreme Judical Court denied that it was deciding "whether
the Commonwealth may administer medication to criminal defendants involuntarily to ensure
their competence to stand trial," 390 Mass. at 38 n. 13, 453 N.E.2d at 444 n. 13, but surely that
was the result of the court's conclusion that the defendant Louraine was denied due process of
law by his involuntary medication. The courts in Murphy, Maryott, and Pray found similar
due process violations. The Hardesty, Hayes, and Law courts found that the state's interests in
bringing a competent defendant to trial outweighed the defendant's interest in being free from
such synthetic sanity. The Hayes court relied primarily on the fact that the defendant had
been off medication only one day prior to his commission of the offense, and therefore held
that he might refrain from taking medication for one day during trial, so that the jury could
observe his demeanor under such circumstances. Hayes, 118 N.H. at 462, 389 A.2d at 1381.
In State v. Lover, the court held that a defendant asserting an insanity defense could be
tried while medicated against his will, although in that case the defendant had been improperly
prevented from asserting that defense. 41 Wash. App. 685, 694, 707 P. 2d 1351, 1351 (1985).
In State v. Cooper, the court held that a defendant asserting an insanity defense was competent
to stand trial even if his competence was obtained through psychotropic medication. 286 N.C.
549, 566, 213 S.E.2d 305, 311 (1975). Neither the defendant nor the court discussed the
question of whether the state could insist on such medication as the price of a trial.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 121-26.
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pelling the defendant to be medicated against his will infringes upon
his common law and constitutional rights to privacy and bodily
integrity.
Due to the extreme infrequency of cases in which the insanity
defense is raised,6 the precise issue framed here rarely arises. Never-
theless, an analysis of this issue provides an ideal occasion for the
reexamination of much of the conventional wisdom about incompe-
tent defendants and the nature of the incompetency plea. A brief his-
torical overview and a look at more current practices will show that
the principle that a mentally incompetent individual might not be
tried was originally premised largely on moral and humanitarian con-
cerns for the defendant. Today, however, the decision not to try an
incompetent defendant, or conversely, to insist on pharmacological
restoration of the defendant's mental health as the price of his being
6. One commentator has quipped that "the incidence of cases in which the insanity
defense is raised is lower than the annual incidence of poisonous snakebites on the island of
Manhattan." GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, MISUSE OF PSYCHIATRY IN
THE CRIMINAL COURTS: COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL 860 (1974) (citing Cohen, Book
Review, 13 CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOLOGY 8 (1968) (reviewing A. GOLDSTEIN, THE
INSANITY DEFENSE (1967))) [hereinafter cited as GAP Report].
One of the most striking things about the current public outcry over the "abuse" of the
insanity defense is the dearth of evidence to support that charge. Although aggregate national
statistics are impossible to obtain, data from those individual states that do maintain records
on the use of the insanity defense show that it is rarely invoked, and even more rarely
successful. For example, in New York it is estimated that only 17%, or 220, of the 127,068
felony arrests made in 1978 resulted in insanity pleas, and of these, only 25%, or 55, were
successful. Limiting the Insanity Defense: Hearings on S. 818, S. 1106, S. 1558, S. 1995, S.
2572, S. 2658, and S. 2669 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Law of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 367 (1982) (statement of Henry J. Steadman). See also
Steadman, Monahan, Hartstone, Davis & Robbins, Mentally Disordered Offenders: A National
Survey of Patients and Facilities, 6 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 31, 37 (1982).
In Michigan, in 1977, defendants raised the insanity plea in .11% of all major felony
arrests, and were successful in about 8% of those cases. Criss & Racine, Impact of Change in
Legal Standard for those Adjudicated Not Guilty By Reason of Insanity 1975-79, 8 BULL. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 261, 264, 271 (1980). Similarly, statistics from California show that
the 259 insanity acquittals in 1980 represented only .6% of all felony dispositions in that year
(the rest were convictions) and were only .1% of all felony arrests made in that year. Turner &
Ornstein, Distinguishing the Wickedfrom the Mentally Ill, CAL. LAW., March, 1982, at 40, 42.
Statistics from New Jersey also support the proposition that the insanity defense is rarely
employed or successful:
In fiscal year 1982 (July 1, 1981 through June 30, 1982), of the more than 32,500
adult cases handled by the New Jersey Office of the Public Defender, insanity
pleas were entered in only fifty-two cases [less than one-sixth of one percent of all
cases. Further, the insanity plea] was successful in only fifteen cases. That figure
represents... one-twentieth of one percent of all cases handled in the course of a
year ....
Letter to the Editor from Joseph H. Rodrigues, Public Advocate for the State of New Jersey,
69 A.B.A. J. 560 (1983). See also Fentiman, "Guilty But Mentally Ill" The Real Verdict is
Guilty, 26 B.C.L. REV. 601 n.2 (1985).
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tried reflects a simplistic equating of mental illness with incompe-
tency, and frequently benefits the state, not the defendant. Accord-
ingly, a reevaluation of the purposes and functions of the
incompetency plea is required in order to consider the state's legiti-
mate interest in not trying defendants who cannot understand or
meaningfully participate in their trials and in protecting the defend-
ant's criminal trial rights and his interest in individual autonomy and
self-determination.
This article's thesis is that given the magnitude of the insanity
defendant's fundamental constitutional liberties-his constitutional
right to present and conduct his defense, his privilege against self-
incrimination, his constitutional right to privacy and bodily integrity,
and his common law right to give informed consent to medical treat-
ment-the state's interest in assuring the defendant's competency
must give way if he chooses to waive his right to be tried while compe-
tent. Most, if not all, of the purposes of the prohibition against trying
an incompetent defendant can be met even if the defendant is tried
without psychotropic medication as long as he is competent to consult
with his counsel at some point before trial. After such consultation,
the court must permit the insanity defendant to waive his right not to
be tried while incompetent, so long as adequate procedural safeguards
are provided.
A. The Incompetency Plea at Common Law
It has long been accepted as axiomatic that the trial of an incom-
petent defendant violates due process7 because such a defendant can-
not make rational decisions about trial strategy and cannot assist his
counsel in preparing an effective defense.' Nevertheless, some hostility
toward the incompetency plea has existed since early common law.
For example, in cases where the defendant refused to enter a plea
upon arraignment, perhaps because of mental incompetency, it was
7. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966).
8. As Lord Hale stated:
If a man in his sound memory commits a capital offense, and before his
arraignment he becomes absolutely mad, he ought not by law to be arraigned
during such frenzy, but be remitted to prison until that incapacity be removed.
The reason is, because he cannot advisedly plead to the indictment .... And if
such person of nonsane memory after his plea, and before his trial become of
nonsane memory, he shall not be tried; or, if, after his trial, he becomes of
nonsane memory, he shall not receive judgment, or, if after judgment he becomes
of nonsane memory, his execution shall be spared; for were he of sound memory,
he might allege somewhat in stay of judgment or execution.
Youtsey v. United States, 97 F. 937, 940 (6th Cir. 1899) (citing 1 M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE
CROWN 34, 35 (1678)).
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the courts' task to determine "whether the defendant was 'mute by
visitation of God,'" in which case his refusal to enter a plea was
entitled to judicial respect, "or 'mute of malice,' "in which case it was
not.9 In order to make this determination, the defendant would be
subjected to peine forte et dure, where he would be gradually crushed
with heavier and heavier weights so as to make it increasingly attrac-
tive to him to enter a plea.10
The common law prohibition against the trial and conviction of
an incompetent defendant was premised on a number of related fac-
tors, most of which stemmed from the Anglo-American model of the
adversarial trial system,"1 in which competing parties, aided by their
counsel, would strive to establish and ascertain the truth. 12 Out of
this adversarial model grew the notion that a defendant who was not
mentally or physically present at trial was unable to carry on the role
of the defendant.'" A defendant who did not understand the nature
and purpose of the proceedings against him, who could not recall or
otherwise provide his attorney with facts that might exonerate him,
who could not interact with counsel, who could not comprehend or
comment upon the testimony of adverse witnesses, and who could not
intelligently make strategic trial decisions, was not only a defendant
who might be unfairly found guilty, but was also simply not the type
of defendant whom our system of adjudication of guilt seeks to con-
vict. 4 Such a defendant was thus deemed incompetent to stand trial.
This emphasis on the accused's ability to function as a defendant
is reflected in the two-pronged test for competency which the
Supreme Court announced in Dusky v. United States.15 The test pro-
vides: "(1) whether he has sufficient present ability to consult with his
lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding, and (2)
9. GAP Report, supra note 6, at 887 (citing A. ROBERTSON, THE LAWS OF THE KINGS
OF ENGLAND, EDWARD I TO HENRY 1 (1925)). See also Hale, supra note 8, at 225-27.
10. GAP Report, supra note 6, at 887 (citing I WALKER, CRIME AND INSANITY IN
ENGLAND (1968)).
11. It has been baldly stated that "the prohibition [against trying an incompetent
defendant] is fundamental to an adversary system of justice." Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162,
171-72 (1975).
12. It has also been suggested that the incompetency plea is compelled out of consideration
for individual human dignity, which cannot be maintained in the face of a defendant's manifest
insensibility to the proceedings going on around him. Graber & Marsh, Ought a Defendant Be
Drugged to Stand Trial, HASTINGS CTR. Rv'r., Feb., 1970, at 8.
13. Foote, A Comment on Pre-Trial Commitment of Criminal Defendants, 108 U. PA. L.
REV. 832, 834 (1960). Accord Slovenko, The Developing Law on Competency to Stand Trial, 5
J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 165, 166 (1977).
14. People v. Lang, 26 Ill. App. 3d 648, 656, 325 N.E.2d 305, 310 (1975); GAP Report,
supra note 6, at 888-89; Note, Incompetency to Stand Trial, 81 HARV. L. REV. 455, 457-58
(1967).
15. 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam).
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whether he has a rational as well as a factual understanding of the
proceedings against him." 16 State and federal statutes, as well as state
and federal courts, have generally followed Dusky when addressing
the competency question, focusing on the defendant's ability to under-
stand the proceedings against him and to assist his counsel in present-
ing a defense. 7 However, several jurisdictions have adopted more
detailed statements of those abilities and understandings a defendant
must display in order to meet a minimal standard of competency. 18
16. Id.
17. Some state competency statutes quote Dusky verbatim. See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.211;
TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 46.02(1) (Vernon 1979). Most, however, parallel the Dusky language,
by focusing on the defendant's capacity to understand the proceedings against him and to
assist in his own defense. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.100(a) (1962): "A defendant who
• . . lacks capacity to understand the proceedings against the defendant or to assist in the
defendant's own defense may not be tried, convicted, or sentenced for the commission of a
crime so long as the incapacity exists." See also 18 U.S.C. § 4241 (Supp. 1984); ARIz. R.
CRIM. P. 11.1; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-603 (1977); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1367 (West 1982);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-8-102(3) (1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-56(d) (West 1985);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 404(a) (1979); D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(a) (1981); HAWAII REV.
STAT. § 704-403 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 18-210 (1979); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 104-10
(1980); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-36-3-1 (Burns 1986); IOWA CODE ANN. § 812.3 (West 1979);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3301 (1981); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 504.040 (Bobbs-Merill 1983);
KY. R. CRIM. P. 8.06; LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 641 (West 1981); MD. HEALTH-
GEN. CODE ANN. § 12-101(d) (1982 & Supp. 1985); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.800(1020)(1)
(Callaghan 1980); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 330.2020(1) (West 1980); MINN. R. CRIM. P.
20.01(1); Mo. STAT. ANN. § 552.020(1) (Vernon 1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-103
(1984); NEV. REV. STAT. § 178.400 (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 4-4(a) (West 1982); N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. LAW § 730.10 (Consol. 1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1001(a) (1983); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12.1-04-04 (1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.37(A) (Page 1982); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1175.1(1) & (2) (West 1986); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.360(2) (1985); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7402(a) (Purdon Supp. 1986); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40.1-5.3-3(a)(3) (1984);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-23-410 (Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-10A-1
(Supp. 1986); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-15-2 (1982); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-169.1(A) (Supp.
1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.77.010(6) (1986); W. VA. CODE § 27-6A-1 (1980); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 971.13(1) (West 1985); Wyo. STAT. § 7-11-302(a) (1977).
The remainder of state statutes fail to articulate a test for incompetency to stand trial.
ALA. CODE § 15-16-21 (1982 & Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-1504 (Harrison 1983); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 101 (1980 & Supp. 1985); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 15
(West 1986); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-13-11 (1973); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-1822 to -1823
(1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 135:17-:18 (1978 & Supp. 1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-9-
1 (1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-7-301 (1984 & Supp. 1986); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4817
(1974). In several of these states, however, there has been a judicial definition of incompetency
to stand trial, again following Dusky. Bailey v. State, 421 So. 2d 1364 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982);
Brown v. State, 215 Ga. 784, 113 S.E.2d 618 (1960); Echols v. State, 149 Ga. App. 620, 255
S.E.2d 92 (1979); State v. Ledger, 444 A.2d 404 (Me. 1982); Thursby v. State, 223 A.2d 61
(Me. 1966); Commonwealth v. Chubbuck, 384 Mass. 746, 429 N.E.2d 1002 (1981); Emanuel v.
State, 412 So. 2d 1187 (Miss. 1982); State v. Johnson, 673 S.W.2d 877, 880 (Tenn. 1984).
18. Wieter v. Settle, 193 F. Supp. 318 (W.D. Mo. 1961). In Wieter, the court provided the
following test of trial competency:
(1) that [the defendant] has mental capacity to appreciate his presence in relation
to time, place and things; (2) that his elementary mental processes are such that
he apprehends (i.e., seizes and grasps with what mind he has) that he is in a
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Like many constitutional rights, the prohibition against the trial
of incompetent defendants stemmed not only from a need to protect
the individual defendant against an unfair and inaccurate trial ver-
dict, 19 but also from a desire to assure society that justice was being
done. The incompetency defense was a means of increasing social
cohesion and respect for the criminal justice system2° because it
insured that the criminal sanction would only be imposed on those
Court of Justice, charged with a criminal offense; (3) that there is a Judge on the
Bench; (4) a Prosecutor present who will try to convict him of a criminal charge;
(5) that he has a lawyer (self-employed or Court-appointed) who will undertake
to defend him against that charge; (6) that he will be expected to tell his lawyer
the circumstances, to the best of his mental ability, (whether colored or not by
mental aberration) the facts surrounding him at the time and place where the law
violation is alleged to have been committed; (7) that there is, or will be, a jury
present to pass upon evidence adduced as to his guilt or innocence of such
charge; and (8) he has memory sufficient to relate those things in his own
personal manner.
Id. at 321-22.
The Wieter decision has had some influence on other courts, perhaps because the Medical
Center for Federal Prisoners is located at Springfield, Missouri and the federal district court
there has had numerous occasions to make competency determinations in habeas corpus pro-
ceedings. See, e.g., United States v. Adams, 297 F. Supp. 596, 598 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); State v.
Guatney, 207 Neb. 501, 512-13, 299 N.W.2d 538, 545 (1980) (Krivosha, C.J., concurring).
The New Jersey legislature has also adopted the Wieter criteria virtually verbatim, while Flor-
ida has adopted the detailed incompetency factors which the Harvard Medical School's Labo-
ratory of Community Psychology proposed in 1973. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:4-4 (West 1982);
FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.21 l(b)(1). See infra note 33. Such a detailed enumeration of competency
criteria has been criticized as "counterproductive," however, to the extent that it substitutes
"particularized judgments on superficial aspects of the defendant's mental state for the more
important, ultimate conclusion of competence." ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 7-
4.1 commentary (1984).
19. See, e.g., John Frith's Case, 22 Howell's St. Tr. 307 (1790). Frith was accused of high
treason for throwing a stone at King George III's coach. The court continued the trial to the
next session, despite the defendant's objections, because of his delusion that he possessed the
powers of Christ and St. Paul. The court relied upon the general principle that the defendant's
mental illness would prevent him from being tried, declaring:
[T]he humanity of the law of England falling into that which common humanity,
without any written law would suggest, has prescribed, that no man shall be
called upon to make his defence at a time when his mind is in that situation as
not to appear capable of so doing; for, however guilty he may be, the inquiring
into his guilt must be postponed to that season, when by collecting together his
intellects, and having them entire, he shall be able so to model his defence as to
ward off the punishment of the law ....
Id. at 318. The authors of the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice declared that "the funda-
mental purpose of the rule [against trying incompetent defendants] is that of promoting the
accuracy of the factual guilt or innocence determination by enabling the attorney to evaluate
and present available defenses to the fact finder. ... ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 7-4.1 commentary (1984).
20. Graber & Marsh, supra note 12 at 8; see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64
(1970); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S 145, 155-56 (1968); Tehan v. Schott, 382 U.S. 406, 415-
16 (1966); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55-56 n.5 (1964); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963).
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who were aware of and could participate in the criminal process. Not
only was it necessary for the defendant to be competent in order for
her attorney to be able to present the best available defense, 2' but it
was also deemed unseemly to try an individual who was not a "con-
scious and intelligent participant" in that trial, 22 as the resulting liti-
gation would "lose . . its character as a reasoned interaction
between an individual and his community and would become an
invective against an insensible object."' 23 It was believed that if court-
room observers perceived that the defendant was incapable of under-
standing and making fundamental trial decisions or that he was
engaging in bizarre and inappropriate behavior, public confidence in,
and support for, the justice system would be undermined.24
A related concern was the idea that the trial of an incompetent
defendant undercuts the purposes of punishment because an essential
element of the philosophy of punishment is that defendants know why
they are being punished .2  This argument is implicit in the principle
of moral blameworthiness which underlies Anglo-American criminal
law2 6-that punishment is only appropriate when one has consciously
chosen to do wrong.27 It is also central to any utilitarian theory of
punishment because the conviction of an incompetent defendant
would fail to achieve either general or specific deterrence.28
B. The Incompetency Determination in Practice
If one examines the development of the law governing incompe-
tency to stand trial, it becomes clear that the multifaceted, functional
21. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 7-4.1 commentary (1984).




26. In Lambert v. California, Justice Frankfurter quoted Justice Holmes on
"blameworthiness":
It is not intended to deny that criminal liability, as well as civil, is founded on
blameworthiness. Such a denial would shock the moral sense of any civilized
community; or, to put it another way, a law which punished conduct which
would not be blameworthy in the average member of the community would be
too severe for that community to bear.
355 U.S. 225, 231-32 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (quoting 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON
LAW 49-50 (1881)).
27. "The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention
is ... as universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human
will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and
evil." Morrisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952) (rejecting the government's
contention that strict liability ought to be imposed for a theft crime merely because the
applicable statute was silent on the question of mens rea).
28. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 7-4.1 commentary (1984).
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approach to the incompetency question, which historically underlay
the prohibition against the trial of incompetent defendants, has now
become one-dimensional. Today, most courts focus solely on the
question of whether the defendant is mentally ill, however that elusive
concept may be defined.29 In many states, the equation of incompe-
tency with mental illness has been accomplished by statute.30  But
even where the governing statute provides a test for incompetency
that is related to the defendant's ability to function at trial 3 1 in a
large number of cases the focus of both the court and the examining
psychiatrist has been on the presence or absence of mental illness in
the defendant.32 In part, this stems from a failure on the part of
judges to provide adequate guidance to the examining psychiatrist as
to what question they want answered. 3   Many psychiatrists perform-
ing competency examinations are uncertain or confused about the test
for competency to stand trial in their jurisdiction, and thus, often
apply the test for criminal responsibility to determine incompetency. 4
Further, even when they are aware of the appropriate standard, psy-
chiatrists often find it difficult to reformulate their clinical findings
into a legal conclusion regarding competency.35 In part, this focus on
mental illness, as opposed to competency, also stems from the psychi-
atrist's understandable inclination to look at the defendant from a
medical perspective, as an object of possible cure.36 Judges also may
29. Just what constitutes "mental illness" or indeed, whether it even exists as a medical
entity, has been the source of intense debate ever since Thomas Szasz first wrote The Myth of
Mental Illness. 15 AM. PSYCHOLOGY 113 (1960). See also A. BROOKS, LAW, PSYCHIATRY
AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 58-88 (1974).
30. Note, supra note 14, at 459. See also supra note 17.
31. Id.
32. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 7-4 introduction (1984); Schulman,
Determination of Competency-Burial at the Crossroad, II LAW PSYCHIATRY AND THE
MENTALLY DISORDERED OFFENDER 37, 44 (1973); Note, supra note 14, at 460.
33. Eizenstat, Mental Competency to Stand Trial, 4 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 379, 388-91
(1969); Hess & Thomas, Incompetency to Stand Trial. Procedures, Results, and Limits, 119
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 713, 715 (1963); Robey, Criteria for Competency to Stand Trial: A
Checklist for Psychiatrists, 122 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 616 (1965); Vann & Morganroth,
Psychiatrists and the Competence to Stand Trial, 42 U. DET. L. REV. 75, 84-85 (1964); see also
United States v. Gundelfinger, 98 F. Supp. 630, 631 (W.D. Pa. 1951).
Courts as well have confused the test for competency with the criteria for criminal
responsibility. Hess & Thomas, supra, at 715. See generally, LABORATORY OF COMMUNITY
PSYCHIATRY, HARVARD MEDICAL SCHOOL, COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL AND MENTAL
ILLNESS (1973).
34. "In an attempt to translate clinical diagnostic findings into the legal conclusions
required by the test for legal competence, mental health professionals have often taken one of
two roads: either they have translated diagnostic labels into conclusory legal findings or have
attempted to construct their own diagnostic criteria to permit application of clinical findings to
legal requirements." ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 7-4.1 commentary (1984).
35. Id.
36. See Schulman, supra note 32, at 44, 46-47; Note, supra note 14, at 470. The tensions
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determine that a particular defendant is incompetent to stand trial out
of a desire to provide her with compulsory psychiatric treatment.3 7
Finally, the focus on mental illness as the sine qua non of incompe-
tency is reflected in the common practice of both defense and prosecu-
tion attorneys of using the incompetency plea and incompetency
examination as a means of finding out more about the defendant's
mental condition at the time of the crime, to determine if an insanity
plea would be warranted, or to obtain information relevant to
sentencing.
8
The consequences of this simplistic equation of incompetency
with mental illness can be serious, both for the defendant and the
state. If the trial is delayed for any significant amount of time as a
result of a finding that the defendant is incompetent, it may become
impossible (due to the death or relocation of critical witnesses or
their fading or changed memories) either for the state to prove its case
against the defendant or for the defendant to establish his innocence.39
Historically, defendants have borne this burden much more heavily
than the state. Indeed, for every defendant acquitted on grounds of
insanity, there are a hundred defendants committed to state mental
hospitals as incompetent to stand trial."° In practice, many prosecu-
tors and judges have apparently not cared if the defendant is brought
to trial, particularly if the state has a weak case, because the interests
of public protection are achieved just as well by the accused's indefi-
nite commitment to a hospital for the criminally insane as they would
be by conviction.41
The automatic treatment of mental illness as synonymous with
incompetency has equally serious consequences in the case of the
insanity defendant who is forcibly medicated in order to attain "com-
petency" to stand trial. Such medication, by altering the defendant's
courtroom behavior and demeanor, deprives him of the opportunity
between the medical model, which focuses on helping, treating, and curing a possibly sick
individual, and the legal model, which focuses on personal liberty and individual autonomy as
paramount goals, are pervasive not only in the area of competency to stand trial, but
throughout the field of law and psychiatry.
37. See Note, supra note 14, at 460.
38. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 7-4.2(d) & (e) commentary (1984);
Schulman, supra note 32, at 44-45.
39. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 7-4.2(d) & (e) commentary (1984); Burt &
Morris, A Proposal for the Abolition of the Incompetency Plea, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 66, 83
(1972); Janis, Incompetency Commitment: The Need for Procedural Safeguards and a Proposed
Statutory Scheme, 23 CATH. U.L. REV. 720, 723 (1974).
40. A. Brooks, supra note 29, at 332 (citing Bacon, Incompetency to Stand Trial:
Commitment to an Inclusive Test, 42 S. CAL. L. REV. 444 (1969)).
41. See, e.g., Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 719 (1972); Foote, supra note 13, at 833,
835; Note, supra note 14, at 455.
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to present the best evidence available of his lack of criminal responsi-
bility-the opportunity to have the jury view him in court as he was
at the time of the offense. At the same time, involuntary medication
permits the state, rather than the defendant, to choose what evidence
he will offer at trial. This medication of the insanity defendant is also
violative of a number of the defendant's rights: his constitutional
right to present a defense to a criminal charge, his privilege against
self-incrimination, his constitutional right to privacy, and his com-
mon law right to give informed consent to all medical treatment.
II. THE COMPELLED MEDICATION OF THE INSANITY
DEFENDANT IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE COMPETENCE IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
A. The Undercutting of the Defendant's Right to Present a Defense
Perhaps the most serious of all the constitutional violations occa-
sioned by forcible medication of the insanity defendant is the denial of
his right to present a defense to the charges against him. American
law has long acknowledged the right to defend. Both the exact nature
of its constitutional underpinnings and the precise parameters of the
right, however, have not always been clear.
Even before the adoption of the federal Constitution, a number
of state constitutions provided that a criminal defendant had a consti-
tutional right to offer a defense. As early as 1776, the Virginia Decla-
ration of Human Rights provided:
[I]n all capital or criminal prosecutions a man hath a right to
demand the cause and nature of his accusation, to be confronted
with accusers and witnesses, to call for evidence in his favour, and
to a speedy trial by an impartial jury of his vicinage, without whose
unanimous consent he cannot be found guilty, nor can he be com-
pelled to give evidence against himself; that no man be deprived of
his liberty except by the law of the land, or the judgment of his
peers.4 2
Massachusetts adopted a parallel provision in its Declaration of
Rights of 1780:
No subject shall be held to answer for any crime or offense, until
the same is fully and plainly, substantially and formally, described
to him; or be compelled to accuse, or furnish evidence against him-
self. And every subject shall have a right to produce all proofs, that
may be favorable to him; to meet the witnesses against him face to
42. Clinton, The Right to Present a Defense: An Emergent Constitutional Guarantee in
Criminal Trials, 9 IND. L. REV. 711, 728 (1976) (quoting VIRGINIA BILL OF RIGHTS § 8
(1776) (current version in VA. CODE art. I § 6 (1982))) (emphasis added).
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face, and to be fully heard in his defense by himself, or his council,
at his election.43
These state constitutional provisions served as models for the
fifth and sixth amendments to the United States Constitution enumer-
ating a number of trial safeguards for the criminal defendant." The
question which cannot be answered unequivocally, given the sparse
legislative history surrounding the adoption of the fifth and sixth
amendments,45 is whether the Framers intended, by choosing lan-
guage which more closely paralleled the Virginia Declaration of
Rights than the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, to exclude a
specific guarantee that a criminal defendant had the right to produce
all evidence in his behalf and to be fully heard in his defense. A
strong argument could be made that such a guarantee was implicitly
included as the underlying unifying principle of the specifically enu-
merated rights of the fifth and sixth amendments.46
Notwithstanding this lack of historical certainty, the Supreme
Court has rendered numerous decisions premised on the importance
of the right to be heard in one's own defense as an essential element of
the fundamental fairness and due process requirements which are cen-
tral to our adversarial system. Although a number of these early deci-
sions were in the civil area,47 in the twentieth century the Court began
to explicitly stress the primary importance of the right to be heard in
one's own defense in criminal proceedings. In a criminal contempt
case, In re Oliver,48 the Court declared that the failure to provide the
43. Id. at 730.
44. The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service, in time of war
or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.
U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
45, Clinton, supra note 42, at 732-39.
46. Id. at 731-39.
47. Id. at 747-49.
48. 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
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defendant with "a reasonable opportunity to defend himself" consti-
tuted a denial of due process.4 9 The Court held that "a person's right
to... an opportunity to be heard in his defense-a right to his day in
court-[is] basic in our system of jurisprudence.' '50
Oliver and other early right to defend cases involved situations of
a total denial of the defendant's right to present his defense. 1 In
more recent years, however, the Supreme Court has recognized that
even a partial deprivation of a defendant's right to present a defense
can constitute a denial of his constitutional right to a fair trial. The
Court has condemned a number of state evidentiary and procedural
rules that impermissibly limited the defendant's ability to mount an
effective defense.
Thus, in Washington v. Texas,52 Washington, the defendant in a
murder case, sought to introduce the testimony of Fuller, an individ-
ual charged with the same crime, to prove that he, rather than Wash-
ington, had fired the fatal shot, that Washington had not been present
at the time of the killing, and that Washington had unsuccessfully
tried to persuade him to leave before he fired at the decedent. The
trial judge refused to admit this testimony, relying on two Texas stat-
utes which provided that a person charged with or convicted of the
same offense as the defendant could not testify on his behalf, unless
called by the prosecution.53 The Supreme Court reversed Washing-
ton's conviction, declaring:
The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their
attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a
defense, the right to present the defendant's version of the facts as
well as the prosecution's to the jury so it may decide where the truth
lies.54
In Webb v. Texas," the Court also found that the defendant had
been denied the opportunity to present critical evidence. The trial
judge had given a lengthy sua sponte lecture to the defendant's sole
witness about the consequences of perjury, which resulted in the wit-
ness's refusal to testify. The Court found that this judicial action had
effectively deprived the defendant of his only opportunity to present a
49. Id. at 273.
50. Id.
51. Clinton, supra note 42, at 748-51.
52. 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
53. Id. at 16. The accomplice had already been convicted and sentenced to fifty years
imprisonment for the murder.
54. Id. at 19 (emphasis added).
55. 409 U.S. 95 (1972).
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defense, and thus denied him due process of law.5 6
In Chambers v. Mississippi,5 7 the Supreme Court reviewed the
application of two state rules of evidence that prevented the defendant
from either cross-examining or otherwise impeaching the testimony of
a witness who had previously admitted to the killing with which
defendant was charged, but who later denied his participation. The
Supreme Court held that denying the defendant the opportunity
either to adequately confront and cross-examine this key witness or to
call other witnesses who would testify as to the key witness's previous
confession was a denial of due process. The Supreme Court defined
due process in this context as "the right to a fair opportunity to
defend against the State's accusations. '58
Most recently, in Ake v. Oklahoma,59 the Supreme Court
declared that a state's refusal to provide an indigent defendant with
the assistance of a psychiatrist to explore the merits of an insanity
defense was also a denial of due process. In reaching this conclusion,
the Court relied on the fundamental principle that "when a State
brings its judicial power to bear on an indigent defendant in a crimi-
nal proceeding, it must take steps to assure that the defendant has a
fair opportunity to present his defense."'  The Court recognized the
critical importance of an expert psychiatric witness in assisting the
jury to understand the nature of the defendant's mental illness and
how it might bear on his criminal responsibility. The Court held that
the state's interest in saving money paled beside the interest of the
defendant-and the public-in obtaining a fair and accurate adjudica-
tion of the insanity issue, explaining that "a criminal trial is funda-
mentally unfair if the State proceeds against.., an indigent defendant
without making certain that he has access to the raw material integral
to the building of an effective defense."'61 The Court emphasized that
an adequate opportunity for the defendant to present his defense was
a critical component of the truth-ascertaining function of our adver-
sary system declaring, "[a] State may not legitimately assert an inter-
est in maintenance of a strategic advantage over the defense, if the
result of that advantage is to cast a pall on the accuracy of the verdict
obtained. ' 62
56. Id. at 98.
57. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
58. Id. at 294.
59. 105 S. Ct. 1087 (1985).
60. Id. at 1093.
61. Id. at 1094.
62. Id. at 1095. See generally id. at 1095-97 (Court discusses role and value of psychiatric
assistance at trial).
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In addition to the series of cases, culminating in Ake, in which
the Supreme Court expressly based its ruling on the constitutional
right to present a defense, the Court has also implicitly affirmed the
defendant's right to present a defense and to control trial strategy in a
number of other decisions. For example, in Brady v. Maryland,63 the
Court reversed a murder conviction because at trial the state refused,
despite the defendant's request, to provide the defense with critical
exculpatory evidence, to wit, a co-defendant's confession to the mur-
der. The Court found that the state's withholding of this evidence
violated due process declaring that by his action the prosecutor had
become, even if unwittingly, the "architect of a proceeding that does
not comport with standards of justice."64
In Brooks v. Tennessee,65 the Court struck down a Tennessee
statute that required a defendant who wished to testify on his own
behalf to take the stand at the beginning of the defense case or not at
all. The Court found the statute constitutionally invalid on two
grounds. First, the statute violated the defendant's privilege against
self-incrimination. By limiting the defendant's ability to decide
whether or not to exercise the privilege to a time before he had heard
other defense witnesses testify and could thus evaluate the value of
their testimony, the state made the assertion of the privilege against
self incrimination costly. 66  Second, the statute impermissibly
infringed on the defendant's right to counsel, as it limited counsel's
ability to offer advice, in terms of trial strategy, as to whether it would
be in the defendant's best interest to testify.67
Finally, in Specht v. Patterson,68 the Court reaffirmed the impor-
tance of providing a defendant with a meaningful opportunity to be
heard in his own defense as an essential element of due process. In
Specht, the defendant, who had been convicted of the offense of taking
indecent liberties, which carried a maximum penalty of ten years
imprisonment, was sentenced under a Colorado law that permitted an
indeterminate commitment as a sex offender. 69 The Court held that
the defendant had been denied due process of law because this com-
mitment was accomplished at a sentencing hearing where the judge
considered psychiatric reports, but no psychiatric testimony, without
giving the defendant an opportunity either to confront and cross-
63. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
64. Id. at 88.
65. 406 U.S. 605 (1972).
66. Id. at 611-12.
67. Id. at 612-13.
68. 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
69. Id. at 607.
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examine the state's witnesses or to offer evidence of his own.7"
In sum, the conclusion that emerges from these cases is that a
defendant in our adversary system has a due process right to present a
defense: a constitutional right to an opportunity to have access to,
and to present all relevant evidence to the trier of fact, and to make, in
consultation with counsel and without interference from the state,
important decisions concerning trial strategy. A trial in which the
defendant is prevented from presenting key defense evidence is a trial
in contravention of due process.
In cases in which the defendant is asserting an insanity defense,
evidence of his mental state at the time of the offense is critical. The
Supreme Court's decision in Ake v. Oklahoma is perhaps the best
illustration of this premise. The lynchpin of the decision was that the
state's refusal to afford an indigent insanity defendant access to a
qualified psychiatrist, who could assist him in evaluating the merits of
his insanity defense and in presenting that defense to the jury, consti-
tuted a denial of due process.7" The Court emphasized the impor-
tance of expert psychiatric testimony in helping the jury understand
the defendant's mental state at the time of the crime, and how it
might have shaped his behavior.72 Stressing that evidence of the
defendant's psychological state was crucial to an accurate resolution
of the sole issue in the case, his sanity, the Court declared that it was
essential that the defendant be able to present all relevant evidence
bearing on this point. Finally, the Court placed great emphasis on
truth as a paramount goal of the adversary system, declaring that the
government had no interest in denying the defendant the ability to
present all pertinent evidence because the goal of the adversarial pro-
cess was an accurate verdict, not victory for the state.73
Lower courts have reached similar conclusions in numerous
cases in which they have underscored the critical importance of the
defendant's ability to present all relevant evidence pertaining to a
mental state defense. In Blake v. Kemp,74 the defendant was charged
with the murder of the two-year-old daughter of his girl friend.
Although the defendant was examined by a psychiatrist in regard to
his mental state at the time of the killing, the police failed to provide
the psychiatrist with the defendant's taped confession made shortly
after the homicide or a suicide note written several days later, both of
70. Id. at 610-11.
71. Ake, 105 S. Ct. at 1093-97.
72. Id. at 1095-96.
73. Id. at 1095-97.
74. 758 F.2d 523 (1lth Cir. 1985).
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which tended to support the defendant's defense of insanity. Nor
were these documents provided to defense counsel until the day
before the trial. The court granted the defendant's petition for writ of
habeas corpus, holding that the withholding of this crucial evidence
from the psychiatrist and counsel denied the defendant his right,
articulated in Ake, to a "psychiatric examination and opinion devel-
oped in a manner reasonably calculated to allow adequate review of
relevant, available information,"75 and consequentially, his right to
the effective assistance of counsel. Without an adequate psychiatric
evaluation, the court reasoned, defendant's counsel was unable to
render adequate assistance on the insanity issue, by subjecting the
prosecution's case to "meaningful adversarial testing."76
In Ronson v. Commissioner of Corrections," the court held that
the trial judge's refusal to permit the defendant's expert psychiatric
witness to testify because the defendant had failed to satisfy the stat-
ute requiring notice of his intent to raise an insanity defense violated
the defendant's sixth amendment right to compulsory process for wit-
nesses on his behalf. The court emphasized that the state interests in
fair notice of the defense and in an orderly trial procedure must be
closely scrutinized when they would restrict the defendant's ability to
introduce relevant evidence-here, crucial evidence supporting the
defendant's insanity defense.78 In addition, the court noted that the
defendant's lawyer had effectively given notice of his intent to call the
psychiatric expert, although not in the precise form required by stat-
ute. The court stated that "maximum 'truth gathering,' rather than
arbitrary limitation, is the favored goal." 79
Similarly, in Hughes v. Mathews,8" the defendant did not assert
an insanity defense but contended that because of his psychopathy, he
was unable to form the specific intent to kill necessary for a conviction
of first degree murder under Wisconsin law.81 The court held that it
was a denial of due process for the trial court to refuse to admit psy-
chiatric testimony bearing on his ability to form that specific intent.
Such evidence was both relevant and competent, and the state had no
legitimate justification for refusing to admit it.12
75. Id. at 528.
76. Id. at 532 (quoting United States v. Cronic, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 2047 (1984)).
77. 604 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1979).
78. Id. at 178-79.
79. Id. at 178.
80. 576 F.2d 1250 (7th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 439 U.S. 801 (1978).
81. Id. at 1259.
82. Id. at 1255-59. Other courts have similarly recognized the importance of permitting
defendants to offer all relevant evidence of their mental state when it bears on a key trial
defense. See, e.g., State v. Woods, 20 Ohio Misc. 2d 1, 484 N.E.2d 773 (C.P. Clermont County
1126
PSYCHOTROPIC DR UGS - INSANITY DEFENSE
In the case of the "synthetically sane" insanity defendant, the
evidence that the defendant typically seeks to offer is that of his own
courtroom demeanor. Although such evidence does not take the
same form as that of an expert psychiatric witness testifying as to the
defendant's mental state at the time of the offense, it is no less critical
than such testimony, and indeed may be even more so, because it
comes directly from the defendant, rather than through the filter of an
outside observer.
A number of courts have recognized the critical importance of
the defendant's demeanor in an insanity case.83 The defendant is the
key player in his trial, whether or not he takes the stand. Throughout
the proceedings, the jury will be evaluating his manner and conduct,
searching for hints as to his character and clues as to whether and
why he committed the crime.84 Although this is always true in a crim-
inal trial, it is especially important in a case where the defendant
raises an insanity defense because the defendant concedes that he
committed the physical act constituting the crime, but argues that he
ought not be convicted because he lacked the guilty mind-the con-
scious choice to do evil-which is an essential element of the crime.85
Often the only way that the defendant can establish his insanity
defense, and put his conduct in a context the jury can understand, is
to emphasize the crime's horror, its violence, and hence, its irrational-
ity. 6 To paint such a picture for the jury, stressing that the terrible
act with which the defendant is charged was a product of an abnor-
mal and diseased mind, it is essential that the defendant be able to
present to the jury a courtroom demeanor which is as close as possible
to that which existed at the time of the offense. 7 Furthermore, in
cases in which the defendant takes the stand, it is obviously critical
for the defendant to be perceived as a truthful witness. To the extent
that psychotropic medication gives a false impression of his veracity,
it severely undercuts his ability to present a defense.8,
It is virtually unavoidable that jurors will use their perceptions of
1984) (psychiatric testimony admissible to support defendant's claim at trial that she was not
predisposed to sell a controlled substance due to her extreme susceptibility to suggestion by
others, and was thus entrapped by police officers into making the sale).
83. E.g., Commonwealth v. Louraine, 390 Mass. 28, 34-35, 453 N.E.2d 437, 442 (1983);
People v. Hardesty, 139 Mich. App. 124, 140, 362 N.W.2d 787, 795 (1984); People v. Van
Diver, 79 Mich. App. 539, 541-42, 261 N.W.2d 78, 79 (1977); In re Pray, 133 Vt. 253, 257, 336
A.2d 174, 177 (1975); State v. Maryott, 6 Wash. App. 96, 101, 492 P.2d 239, 242 (1977).
84. See In re Pray, 133 Vt. at 257-58, 366 A.2d at 177.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 26-27.
86. In re Pray, 133 Vt. at 254, 336 A.2d at 175.
87. Hardesty, 139 Mich. App. at 254, 362 N.W.2d at 797.
88. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 7-4.14 commentary (1984).
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the defendant's present mental state, as demonstrated by his court-
room demeanor, as evidence of his prior mental state.8 9 Jurors will
consider other evidence adduced at trial, including the testimony of
the defendant himself, in light of that demeanor.90 In Walker v. But-
terworth,91 for example, the prosecutor was permitted to comment to
the jury on the insanity defendant's personal exercise of his preemp-
tory challenges, citing it as evidence of both the defendant's present
sanity and his sanity at the time of the offense. On an appeal from the
denial of the defendant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the
court held that this compulsory exercise of his preemptory challenges,
combined with the prosecutor's repeated comments thereon, violated
the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination, as the state was
requiring him to be a witness against himself on the question of his
sanity at the time of the offense.9 2
Similarly, in the case of the insanity defendant who has been
declared "competent" to stand trial only if he takes psychotropic
medication, the defendant's chemically-induced demeanor can have a
significant and devastating effect on his ability to persuade the jury of
the merits of his insanity defense. The effects of psychotropic medica-
tion on the defendant's demeanor may make it difficult, if not impossi-
ble, for him to persuasively offer evidence of his insanity at the time
of the offense. The drugs may also have a negative effect on his ability
to cooperate with and assist his attorney in preparing a defense.
The effects of psychotropic medication on an insanity defendant's
ability to present a defense are most clearly seen in the case of schizo-
phrenic patients who are forcibly medicated with antipsychotic drugs
such as thorazine, 93 although they are also apparent in the case of
defendants with other types of mental illness. 94 While the precise eti-
ology of schizophrenia is unknown, physicians have theorized that the
disease is caused by inappropriate amounts of two chemical neuro-
transmitters in the brain, dopamine and norepinephrine. 95 This leads
to a situation where brain activity is highly stimulated, but not
focused, which results in thought disorders, hallucinations, delusions,
89. Walker v. Butterworth, 599 F.2d 1074, 1084 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 937
(1979).
90. Louraine, 390 Mass. at 34-35, 453 N.E.2d at 442.
91. 599 F.2d 1074 (ist Cir. 1979).
92. Id. at 1077, 1082-84.
93. See supra note 2.
94. Cf Hollister, Psychotropic Drugs and Court Competence, in LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND
THE MENTALLY DISORDERED OFFENDER 14, 17-18 (1972).
95. Comment, The Right to Adequate Treatment Versus the Right to Refuse Antipsychotic
Drug Treatment: A Solution to the Dilemma of the Involuntarily Committed Psychiatric
Patient, 33 EMORY L.J. 441, 445 (1984).
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and paranoid ideation.96 The antipsychotics alter the relative propor-
tions of dopamine and norepinephrine to reduce or eliminate the overt
symptoms of schizophrenia, thus diminishing the defendant's violent
and disruptive behavior. 97
A variety of side effects, however, often accompany the use of
antipsychotics. One of these, akinesia, causes the defendant to feel a
lack of energy and to complain of being "dead inside,""8 to feel that
everything is dull and boring, and that nothing matters. 99 Externally,
akinesia may alter the defendant's facial expression, so that he
appears in mild cases to lack spontaneity of expression, and in severe
cases to have a wooden, "mask-like" face. 10°
A different, but also common, side effect of the administration of
psychotropic drugs is akathisia,' 0 ' an emotional state of inner restless-
ness and agitation, in which the defendant feels "all nerved up," or
"squirmy inside," so that he is unable to be comfortable in any posi-
tion, and, in extreme cases, will suffer inner feelings of panic. These
internal symptoms are externally manifested by a constant crossing
and uncrossing of the legs and an inability to sit still, even for a few
minutes. 102
Finally, the most frequent and predictable side effect is tardive
dyskinesia.' °3 This condition, which results from lengthy and high
dosage treatment with antipsychotic drugs, is irreversible. A patient
suffering from tardive dyskinesia exhibits grotesque involuntary
movements of the tongue, lips, and jaws, which may in some cases
extend to the trunk and bodily extremities. Unfortunately, the medi-
cation often masks the symptoms of tardive dyskinesia and thus, they
become apparent only after the patient has discontinued use of the
drugs. o'4
The result of the compelled administration of antipsychotic
96. Id. at 445-46.
97. Id. at 446; Kemna, Current Status of Institutionalized Mental Health Patients' Riqht to
Refuse Psychotropic Drugs, 6 J. LEGAL MED. 107, 110 (1985).
98. Van Putten, Why do Schizophrenic Patients Refuse To Take Their Drugs?, 31
ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 67, 69 (1974).
99. Note, Antipsychotic Drugs: Regulating Their Use in the Private Practice of Medicine,
15 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 331, 348 (1984).
100. Van Putten, supra note 98, at 69. Such a rigid, "mask-like" face may also be a result of
one of the other side effects of antipsychotic drugs, parkonsonism, which is also characterized
by "drooling, muscle stiffness and rigidity, a shuffling gait [often referred to colloquially as the
Stellazine Shuffle], and tremors." Kemna, supra note 97, at 112.
101. Kemna, supra note 97, at 112.
102. Gutheil & Applebaum, supra note 2, at 108; Van Putten, supra note 98, at 68-69.
103. R. BALDESSARINI, CHEMOTHERAPY IN PSYCHIATRY 46-48 (1977); Rhoden, The
Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 363, 381 (1980).
104. Id.
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drugs, with its elimination of overt symptoms of serious mental illness
and the concomitant presence of misleading and distracting side
effects, is that the jury is presented with a totally false picture of the
defendant's mental processes. The use of psychotropic drugs pre-
cludes the jury from catching even a glimpse of the defendant's true
mental state,I 5 which is characterized by violent delusions, paranoid
hallucinations, and other types of thought disorders. 10 6 Instead, the
jury sees a defendant who appears either calm, rational, and blas6 in
regard to the crime he is accused of committing,' 7 or one who is so
restless and jumpy that his fidgeting itself can easily be taken as evi-
dence of his consciousness of guilt. The defendant's altered demeanor
105. In commentary, the authors to the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice noted that the
proferred defense of insanity "is undermined by the picture of the docile defendant seated at
counsel table." ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 7-4.14 commentary (1984).
106. Evidence of the defendant's mental illness is obviously crucial to the successful
presentation of an insanity defense. The defendant must show that he was suffering from a
mental disease or defect, at the time of the crime, that resulted in either a cognitive or
volitional impairment causally related to his commission of the crime. For example, the
M'Naghten rule, followed in England and many American jurisdictions, states:
[E]very man is to be presumed to be sane, and to possess a sufficient degree of
reason to be responsible for his crimes, until the contrary be proved.., and ...
to establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at
the time of committing of the act, the party accused was labouring under such a
defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality
of the act he was doing; or if he did know it, that he did not know that he was
doing what was wrong.
M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843) (cited in J. BIGGS, THE GUILTY MIND 105
(1955)).
Similarly, the American Law Institute (ALI) definition of insanity provides that:
1. A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such con-
duct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity
either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct
to the requirements of law.
2. The terms "mental disease or defect" do not include an abnormality mani-
fested only by repeated criminal and otherwise anti-social conduct.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (The second paragraph has been
adopted in some, but not all, of the jurisdictions that have adopted the ALI test of insanity.).
For a discussion of the now discredited Durham rule, followed only in New Hampshire,
see State v. Jones, 50 N.H. 369, 398 (1871) ("[A]n accused is not criminally responsible if his
unlawful act was the product of mental disease or defect."); see also Durham v. United States,
214 F.2d 862, 874-75 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
Most recently, in response to the public outcry over John Hinckley's aquittal on grounds
of insanity, Congress enacted a new test of insanity applicable to federal prosecutions. 18
U.S.C. § 20(a) (1984).
It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under any Federal statute that, at the
time of the commission of the acts constituting the offense, the defendant, as a
result of a severe mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the nature
and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts. Mental disease or defect does not
otherwise constitute a defense.
Id.
107. Mynatt, Artificial Competence, 22(3) HoSp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 96 (1971).
1130
PSYCHOTROPIC DR UGS - INSANITY DEFENSE
thus prevents the jury from seeing or relating to him either as he was
at the time of the crime or as he was at the time that a psychiatrist
examined him. These factors seriously undermine the effectiveness of
favorable psychiatric and lay testimony supporting his defense of
insanity."10 If the defendant takes the stand, this problem is exacer-
bated, because "[a] defendant whose emotions are dulled, and whose
responses are not appropriate to the emotional message conveyed by
his testimony, may present a false impression of his veracity .... 109
At least one study has shown that the trier of fact is most likely
to disagree with the clinician's assessment of the defendant's legal
insanity when the defendant in fact has a history of schizophrenia and
treatment with psychoactive medication.'1  The study showed that
juries seemed to be most influenced by these defendants' relatively
moderate psychopathology and cognitive and behavioral impairment,
and declined to defer to a clinical judgment of insanity which
appeared to have some objective, verifiable indicia of support."'
It can therefore be inferred that when an insanity defendant with
a history of schizophrenia and psychotropic drug treatment appears,
due to such treatment, to be calm, in control, and capable of under-
standing the proceedings against him, a jury may be strongly inclined
to ignore the expert witness's assessment of psychiatric impairment.
Such a jury will be much more likely to find the defendant guilty,
rather than acquitting him on grounds of insanity. Instead of seeing a
violent, extremely disturbed individual, careening out of control
because of his abnormal thought processes, the jury may easily per-
ceive the defendant as a "calculating, merciless criminal," 1 2 unmoved
by trial testimony relating to the grotesque and terrifying conduct in
which he is alleged to have engaged.
This was the situation in State v. Murphy,113 where a defendant
countering a charge of first degree murder with an insanity defense1 14
was given powerful tranquilizers immediately prior to trial as treat-
ment for a severe cold.'1I When the defendant took the stand in his
108. Turner & Ornstein, supra note 6, at 43; GAP Report, supra note 6, at 904.
109. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 7-4.14 commentary (1984).
110. Rogers, Cavanaugh, Seman & Harris, Legal Outcome and Clinical Findings: A Study
of Insanity Evaluations, 12 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 75, 80 (1984).
111. Id. at 81.
112. Burt & Morris, supra note 39, at 85-86 (1972).
113. 56 Wash. 2d 761, 355 P.2d 323 (1960) (en banc).
114. Although the defendant entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, his own
psychiatric witnesses testified that the defendant was able to distinguish between right and
wrong (the test for insanity under the M'Naghten rule) and thus the trial court withdrew the
insanity issue from the jury's consideration. Id. at 762-63, 355 P.2d at 324.
115. Id. at 765, 355 P.2d at 325-26.
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own defense and admitted committing the crime charged he appeared
"casual, cool, not at all perturbed and showed a lackadaisical atti-
tude.""' 6 The Supreme Court of Washington reversed his conviction,
on the ground that his chemically-altered demeanor may have signifi-
cantly affected the jury's decision to impose the death penalty." t7
Similarly, in In re Pray," a defendant charged with murder and
asserting an insanity defense was heavily medicated with antipsychot-
ics and barbituates, apparently in an effort to control his violent
courtroom outbursts. These drugs caused the defendant to appear
"quiet and tractable,.., rational,... well oriented, [and] ... coopera-
tive,'1 19 seemingly aware of what was going on during trial, and able
to answer questions clearly. The Supreme Court of Vermont reversed
the defendant's conviction, declaring that his forcible medication
may well have been devastating to the defendant's insanity defense:
[T]he jury never looked upon an unaltered, undrugged Gary Pray
at any time during the trial. Yet his deportment, demeanor, and
day-to-day behavior during that trial, before their eyes, was a part
of the basis of their judgment with respect to the kind of person he
really was, and the justifiability of his defense of insanity. [It there-
fore] may ... have been necessary, in view of the critical nature of
the issue, to expose the jury to the undrugged, unsedated Gary
Pray, at least in so far as safety and trial progress might permit. 120
A second vice of psychotropic medication lies in its impairment
of the defendant's ability to effectively consult with counsel in
presenting his insanity defense. While the antipsychotics remove the
most violent and bizarre aspects of the defendant's behavior, making
it possible for him to communicate in an apparently more rational
manner,' 2 ' they also generate some "cognitive dampening," an
impairment of the defendant's "ability to remember, reason, or func-
116. Id. at 766, 355 P.2d at 326.
117. The court declared:
[W]here the defendant appears as a witness and admits commiting the criminal
acts charged constituting first degree murder, a significant consideration in the
minds of the members of the jury respecting the penalty to be imposed may well
be their evaluation of defendant's attitude in regard to the crime he has
committed.
Id. at 767, 355 P.2d at 326.
118. 133 Vt. 253, 336 A.2d 174 (1975).
.119. Id. at 256, 336 A.2d at 177.
120. Id. at 257-58, 336 A.2d at 177. The court left open the question of whether such an
instruction would be adequate to protect the defendant's right to present a defense of insanity.
121. See State v. Jojola, 89 N.M. 489, 553 P.2d 1296 (1976) (rejecting defendant's claim
that his forcible restoration to competency through the use of thorazine violated due process).
The court found that "Thorazine allows the cognitive part of the brain to come back into
play," reasoning that "a person being dosed with Thorazine is sedated emotionally more than
cognitively." Id. at 491, 553 P.2d at 1298-99.
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tion effectively in any complex learning situation." '22 This may have
a devastating impact on the defendant's ability to assist his attorney in
investigating and preparing a defense. The chemical dampening or
flattening of a person's will can also lead to a suicidal depression,
reflective of the defendant's "loss of a sense of self-determination,"
seriously undermining the desire for self-preservation which is so nec-
essary to productive dialogue with counsel.1 23 Even if the defendant
is not suicidal, the same drugs which result in a flattening of affect
may also cause the defendant to have a lessened appreciation of the
realities of his situation as a criminal defendant including a reduction
in normal, healthy anxiety, producing a "'don't care' mental status
rather than responses based on self-protection."1 24 Such a defendant
may "agree to less effective measures in the preparation of his trial
defense than would a truly competent and anxious person charged
with a crime." '125
Thus, while the forcible administration of psychotropic drugs
would appear to benefit the defendant by diminishing the overt symp-
toms of his mental illness and making him more rational and better
able to cooperate with his attorney in preparing a defense, the reality
may be that as a result of these drugs the defendant can neither recall
nor understand facts which are crucial to his defense nor appreciate
the seriousness of his predicament. Because he is therefore unable to
aggressively assist his counsel in asserting a defense, he is simply not
in a position to function as a defendant. This is particularly so where
the defense attorney is unsophisticated in dealing with medicated
defendants, and the defendant's misleading symptomology may go
unrecognized. 126 Thus, the combined effects of compelled pharmaco-
logical treatment of the defendant's mental illness both on the defend-
ant's demeanor (on and off the witness stand) and on his ability to
effectively consult with his attorney may severely impair his ability to
present an insanity defense.
127
122. Note, supra note 99, at 347. Such cognitive impairment can also occur with the
administration of antidepressant medication, which may cause mental confusions or delirium.
See generally Hollister, supra note 94.
123. Note, supra note 99, at 348.
124. Mynatt, supra note 107, at 96.
125. Id.
126. In re Pray, 133 Vt. at 256-57, 336 A.2d at 177; cf State v. Murphy, 56 Wash. at 766,
355 P.2d at 326.
127. The Supreme Court has never considered the question of whether the insanity defense
itself is constitutionally required. Of the six state courts that have addressed this issue, five
have held that the defense is constitutionally required under either the due process or equal
protection clauses. For a detailed analysis of the constitutional underpinnings of the insanity
defense, see Fentiman, supra note 6, at 641-46. Of course, if the Supreme Court were to hold
that the Constitution mandates the insanity defense, then the forcible medication of an insanity
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A number of courts and commentators have suggested that the
appropriate remedy under these circumstances is to require the
defendant to be tried while synthetically sane, while giving cautionary
instructions to the jury that his trial demeanor is chemically induced
and may not be reflective of his state of mind at the time of the
offense.'28  Such measures, however, would be woefully inadequate.
Cautionary instructions are notoriously insufficient to protect a
defendant against the damaging impact of inadmissible evidence. As
Justice Jackson once wrote: "The naive assumption that prejudicial
effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury, . . . all practicing
lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction."' 29 Indeed, in the particular
case posed here, where the inadmissible evidence is not simply an iso-
lated bit of testimony, but the defendant's demeanor throughout the
trial, any cautionary instruction which could be framed 131 would, by
defendant and the consequent undercutting of the insanity defense would be a separate
constitutional violation.
128. See, e.g., People v. Hardesty, 139 Mich. App. 124, 145-46, 362 N.W.2d 787, 797
(1984); ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 7-4.14 commentary (1984); Burt & Morris,
supra note 38, at 86; Note, Compelling Competence Through the Use of Psychotropic Drugs: A
Due Process Analysis, 62 N.C.L. REV. 1271, 1276-77 (1984). The ABA Standards for Criminal
Justice regarding trial competency permit the trial of a defendant whose competence is
maintained by psychotropic medication as long as there is adequate explication of the drugs'
effects to the jury. The relevant standard provides:
(a) A defendant should not be considered incompetent to stand trial because the
defendant's present mental competence is dependent upon continuation of
treatment or habilitation which includes medication, nor should a defendant be
prohibited from standing trial or entering a plea solely because that defendant is
being provided such services under professional supervision.
(b) If the defendant proceeds to trial with the aid of treatment or habilitation
which may affect demeanor, either party should have the right to introduce
evidence regarding the treatment or habilitation and its effects and the jury be
instructed accordingly.
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 7-4.14 (1984).
129. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)
(citations omitted).
130. In Pray, the court declared:
At the very least [the jurors] should have been informed that (the defendant] was
under heavy, sedative medication, that his behavior in their presence was
strongly conditioned by drugs administered to him at the direction of the State,
and that his defense of insanity was to be applied to a basic behavior pattern that
was not the one they were observing.
In re Pray, 133 Vt. 253, 257-58, 336 A.2d 174, 177 (1975). The court admitted, however, that
such a limiting instruction might be inadequate, and that it might be necessary for the defend-
ant to be tried in an unmedicated state. Id. See also State v. Law, 270 S.C. 664, 671-72, 244
S.E.2d 302, 306 (1978).
The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice on competency attained through psychotropic
medication follows In re Pray, concluding:
Adverse effects on the defendant will be sufficiently ameliorated if the jurors are
given sufficient explanation of the fact that the defendant is on medication and a
description of the effects of that medication on the defendant. The description of
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the very nature of the prejudice sought to be avoided, be inadequate.
Equally inadequate would be the receipt of expert testimony on the
dosage and effects of the medication given the defendant. ,3' At best,
such testimony only mitigates the unfair prejudice which may result
as a consequence of his controlled outward appearance. It cannot
compensate for the positive value to the defendant's case of the jury
viewing his demeanor in an unmedicated condition. 132 Further, such
testimony would simply expand the arena for the "battle of the
experts" usually present in insanity defense cases. Psychiatric experts
for the prosecution would testify that the dosage level was minimal,
and sufficient only to enhance the defendant's abilities to participate
in trial. Defense psychiatrists, on the other hand, would declare that
the dosages were high, severely distorting the defendant's personality
as well as his cognitive abilities. Thus, the only way for the jury to
accurately assess the defendant's mental state when unmedicated is to
permit him to stand trial in that condition.
As the defendant's demeanor provides a backdrop to all the testi-
mony that the jury hears and interprets, 133 it is impossible to expect
that either a limiting instruction or extended testimony concerning
drug effects on the defendant could cause the jury to discard its
impressions of the defendant's demeanor throughout trial in deter-
mining whether he was criminally responsible at the time of the
offense. As the Supreme Court has stated: "Discrimination so subtle
is a feat beyond the compass of ordinary minds [but] [i]t is for ordi-
nary minds, and not psychoanalysts, that our rules of evidence are
framed .... When the risk of confusion is so great as to upset the
balance of advantage, the evidence ... [must go] out.' 1 34
Another suggested alternative is showing the jury a videotape of
the defendant in an unmedicated state. 135 This alternative is similarly
inadequate. While such a tape would give the trier of fact a more
the medication's effects should include an explanation of the type and the dosage
of the medication upon the mental state of the defendant, including his appear-
ance, attitude and verbal style. In this way, although the jury will not have
observed the unmedicated defendant, they will have available the facts necessary
to enable them to make an accurate assessment of the defendant's undrugged
mental state, realizing that they are observing appearance and demeanor signifi-
cantly altered by the medication.
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 7-4.14 commentary (1984).
131. Id.
132. Commonwealth v. Louraine, 390 Mass. 28, 35, 453 N.E.2d 437, 442 (1983).
133. Walker v. Butterworth, 599 F.2d 1074, 1084 (1st Cir. 1979); Louraine, 390 Mass. at 34-
35, 453 N.E.2d at 442.
134. Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 104 (1933).
135. People v. Hardesty, 139 Mich. App. 124, 147, 362 N.W.2d 787, 798 (1984) (Borman,
J., concurring).
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accurate picture of the defendant while he was not under the influence
of psychotropic drugs, and thus would arguably provide the factfinder
with some standard of comparison to use in deciding whether or not
the defendant was insane at the time of the offense, the videotape
would provide only one small glimpse of the defendant in his unmedi-
cated state. Its impact would be minimal when compared with the
persistent and cumulative effects of the jury's daily viewing of a
defendant with a wholly different demeanor at trial. It is thus highly
unlikely that a videotape of the unmedicated defendant could over-
come the subtle and immeasurable impact on the jury of viewing a
medicated defendant throughout the remainder of the trial.
To find that either a videotape, cautionary instructions, or expert
testimony on the psychotropic medication issue could cure the preju-
dicial effects of exposing the jury throughout the trial to the defend-
ant's forcibly altered and misleading demeanor would effectively
repeal a fundamental principle of our criminal justice system-that
some violations of constitutional rights are so serious that they inevi-
tably deny the defendant his right to a fair trial, and thus can never be
harmless error.
136
Finally, none of these alternatives address the problem of
psychotropic medication's interference with the defendant's ability to
confer and cooperate with his counsel in preparing his defense. As
noted earlier, these effects may be extremely insidious. The defendant
may appear to be calm, rational, and capable of organized and
directed behavior, all vitally necessary to recalling key facts pertinent
to the defense, discovering witnesses, and intelligently planning trial
strategy. 137 However, he may be simultaneously suffering from an eas-
ily overlooked cognitive impairment and may also lack the critical
instinct for self-preservation which must be present if he is to mount a
successful defense: he must care enough to do his very best. Thus,
the synthetically sane defendant may go through the motions of
assisting his counsel in preparing a defense, and may in fact appear, to
an attorney unsophisticated about psychiatric issues, to be doing just
that. Yet, the defendant's cognitive and emotional ability to actively
participate in the marshalling of evidence and shaping of trial strat-
egy-in short, to present a defense-may be seriously impaired.
Thus, the forcible medication of an insanity defendant with
136. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1962) (denial of counsel to indigent
defendant constituted a denial of due process); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958) (use of
a confession that resulted from denial of counsel, coercion, and other infringements of the
defendant's rights, deprives him of "that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of
justice").
137. See supra text accompanying notes 121-26.
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psychotropic drugs in order to eliminate the most overt symptoms of
his mental illness and make him "competent" to stand trial violates
his fundamental due process right to present a defense, because of its
impact on both his trial demeanor and his ability to actively partici-
pate in the planning of trial strategy.
B. The Infringement of the Defendant's Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination
The forcible administration of psychotropic drugs to the insanity
defendant in order to render him "competent" to stand trial also vio-
lates his privilege against self-incrimination, guaranteed by the fifth
and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution, 38 as
well as by numerous state constitutional provisions. 39 This is true
whether or not the defendant chooses to testify. The vice of the forci-
ble medication of the defendant lies both in the fact of state compul-
sion and in the fact that it leads to the jury's consideration of
misleading and inaccurate information concerning the defendant's
mental state at trial and, inferentially, at the time of the offense. Fur-
ther, the state's drugging of the insanity defendant into a misleading
persona permits the government to undercut the presumption of inno-
cence with which every defendant is clothed at the commencement of
trial as a requirement of due process. This undercutting of the pre-
sumption of innocence is a separate constitutional violation. By mak-
ing it easier for the state to rebut the evidence proffered by the
defendant on the question of his insanity, this compulsory medication
undermines one of the essential purposes of the fifth amendment-to
insure that in the contest between the state and the individual, the
138. For the text of the fifth amendment, see supra note 44. The fourteenth amendment
provides that no "State shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
139. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 6; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 9; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 15; ARK.
CONST. art. II, § 8; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 18; CONN. CoNST. art I,
§ 8; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 7; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9; GA. CONST. art. I, § I, para. XIII;
HAWAII CONST. art. I, § 10; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 13; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 10; IND. CONST.
art. I, § 14; KAN. CONST. § 10; Ky. CONST. § 11; LA. CONST. art. I, §§ 13, 16; ME. CONST.
art. I, § 6; MD. CONST. art. 22; MASS. CONST. art. 12; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 17; MINN.
CONST. art. I, § 7; MISS. CONsT. art. III, § 26; Mo. CONST. art. I, § 19; MONT. CONST. art. II,
§ 25; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 12; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 8; N.H. CONST. part I, art. 15; N.M.
CONST. art. II, § 15; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 23; N.D. CONST. art I,
§ 12; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 10; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 21; OR. CONST. art. I, § 12; PA.
CONST. art. I, § 9; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 13; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 12; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 9;
TENN. CONST. art. I, § 9; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 12; VT. CONST. ch.
I, art. 10; VA. CONST. art. I, § 8; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 8; W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 5; Wis.
CONST. art. I, § 8; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 11.
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state shoulders the entire load. 40
In order to fully understand the nature of the fifth amendment
violation that the compulsory psychotropic medication of the insanity
defendant occasions, one must examine the policies and purposes of
that amendment. Although its aims are many and varied, a few are
especially pertinent here. The Supreme Court has articulated the first
goal, which has already been noted: that "our preference for an accu-
satorial rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice" reflects
a belief that fundamental fairness requires "a fair individual-state bal-
ance," in which "the government in its contest with the individual [is
required] to shoulder the entire load." 141 In practice, this allocation
of responsibilities means that the state must produce all the evidence
against the defendant on its own, not by the simple cruel expedient of
forcing it from his own lips. 142 Particularly where the defendant is
insane or otherwise mentally infirm, it is imperative that the defend-
ant not be made the deluded instrument of his own conviction. 143 In
part, this reflects a concern that coerced confessions are more likely
to be unreliable.'" But it also grows out of a fundamental belief that
in our democratic system, any self-incriminating statement must be
given freely, rationally, and voluntarily.' 45 The state must be pre-
vented from overcoming the mind and will of the person under inves-
tigation and depriving him of the freedom to decide whether or not to
assist the state in securing his conviction.'46 To twist the body or the
mind of the accused until he breaks is inimical to the values that the
fifth amendment seeks to protect.'47
In order to insure that the numerous values that the Framers
designed the amendment to protect are in fact adequately safe-
guarded, it is imperative that its privilege be as "broad as the mischief
against which it seeks to guard."'' 48 Thus, just as the rack and the
screw were objected to as unjust methods of obtaining a confession
from an accused at the time of the Inquisition and the Star Cham-
ber,"' so today we must also object to the state using psychotropic
drugs to force a defendant to effectively admit his guilt by compelling
him to present to the jury evidence of his apparent sanity at the time
140. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
141. Id.
142. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 582 (1961).
143. Id. at 581.
144. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 47 (1966).
145. Culombe, 367 U.S. at 583, 602; Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207-08 (1960).
146. Gault, 387 U.S. at 47.
147. Culombe, 367 U.S. at 584.
148. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892).
149. See Culombe, 367 U.S. at 581; Blackburn, 361 U.S. at 206.
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of the trial and, by implication, at the time of his offense. In each
case, it is the defendant who is communicating this incriminating
information to the trier of fact, and it is the state which has com-
manded the result, without the defendant exercising a free choice.
By thus compelling the defendant to present evidence of his own
sanity through his demeanor, the state is permitted to substantially
lighten its burden of proof at trial. Forcible medication of the
defendant enables the state to rebut his defense of insanity, not by
offering independent evidence of his sanity at the time of the offense
(e.g. through psychiatric experts, medical records, or lay witnesses),
but by resorting to the cruel expedient of injecting the defendant with
a chemical that so alters his demeanor that he becomes the vehicle of
his own conviction. 50 As the court noted in In re Pray,'5' "the jury
never looked upon an unaltered, undrugged [defendant] at any time
during the trial. Yet his deportment, demeanor, and behavior...
before their eyes, was a part of the basis of their judgment with
respect to ... the justifiability of his defense of insanity.' 52 To permit
the state to force a defendant to assume such a misleading demeanor,
and then to use it as evidence against him, is as reprehensible an act of
state compulsion as were the primitive instruments of state torture
used nearly four hundred years ago.
One might object, however, that the privilege against self-incrim-
ination is inapplicable to this situation because it protects only against
state-compelled testimonial or communicative evidence, and that at
least where the defendant does not testify, the mere exhibition of his
body to the jury cannot be considered to be within the ambit of the
constitutional prohibition.'53 In the landmark case of Schmerber v.
California,"' the Supreme Court did indeed draw a distinction
between "real" or "physical" evidence, which was not protected
against compulsory state production, and "testimonial" or "commu-
nicative" evidence, which was protected.'55 The Supreme Court rec-
150. See Culombe, 367 U.S. at 581.
151. In re Pray, 133 Vt. 253, 336 A.2d 174 (1975).
152. Id. at 257, 336 A.2d at 177.
153. State v. Bottomly, 208 N.J. Super. 82, 504 A.2d 1223 (Law Div. 1984), aff'd, 209 N.J.
Super. 23, 506 A.2d 1237 (App. Div. 1986). In Bottomly, the court held that a videotape of the
defendant made shortly after his arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol was
admissible at his trial on that charge. The court reasoned that the evidence in the videotape
concerning the "defendant's manner, speech, gestures and general demeanor [was relevant to]
show the physical manifestations of intoxication," and was "no more testimonial than the
taking of still pictures, blood or urine samples held to be outside the privilege [against self-
incrimination]." Id. at 87-88, 504 A.2d at 1226 (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757
(1966)).
154. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
155. In Schmerber, the defendant contended that the taking of a blood sample against his
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ognized the difficulty, however, of drawing a clear line between the
two, and indicated that the distinction was not based simply on the
question of whether it was the body, rather than the voice, of the
defendant that was the source of the incriminating evidence. Using
the illustration of polygraph tests, the Court stated:
There will be many cases in which such a distinction is not readily
drawn. Some tests seemingly directed to obtain "physical evi-
dence," for example, lie detector tests measuring changes in body
function during interrogation, may actually be directed to eliciting
responses which are essentially testimonial. To compel a person to
submit to testing in which an effort will be made to determine his
guilt or innocence on the basis of physiological responses, whether
willed or not, is to evoke the spirit and history of the Fifth
Amendment. 156
Thus, the court recognized that the test of "testimonial" vs. "physi-
cal" evidence is not whether or not words are spoken, but rather
whether the defendant is being asked to communicate his thoughts or
ideas. For example, the court noted, that "[a] nod or head-shake is as
much a 'testimonial' or 'communicative' act in a sense as are spoken
words."' 57 Somewhat similarly, with a polygraph, it is not the
defendant's consciously chosen verbal responses to questions that are
viewed as telling evidence against him, but rather his involuntary bod-
ily responses to those questions.
More recent cases following Schmerber have emphasized this
same point. In Serratore v. People,"5 8 the court reversed a defendant's
burglary conviction on the ground that the prosecution had improp-
erly attempted to insist that the very short defendant participate in a
courtroom demonstration of his reaching ability, which would show
that his fingerprints could only have been placed in a certain inacces-
sible spot if he had in fact unlawfully entered the burglarized prop-
erty. The Colorado Supreme Court held that despite the fact that the
defendant had not been asked to testify, a clear violation of his privi-
lege against self-incrimination was established. The court stated,
[H]e was being asked to participate in a contrived experiment...
concerning his physical abilities to perform a particular act.
Clearly, the purpose of the demonstration was to communicate to
the jury the defendant's physical abilities to perform an act that the
will violated his privilege against self-incrimination. In rejecting this argument, the Supreme
Court noted, "the privilege is a bar against compelling 'communications' or 'testimony,' but
that compulsion which makes a suspect or accused the source of 'real or physical evidence'
does not violate it." Id. at 764.
156. Id. (emphasis added).
157. Id. at 761 n.5.
158. Serratore v. People, 178 Colo. 341, 497 P.2d 1018, 1022 (1972).
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prosecution believed him unable to perform. The prosecutor was
requesting the same communication from the defendant that he
obviously could not have compelled the defendant to explain from
the witness stand .... This kind of evidence is prohibited by...
Schmerber. 5 9
Similarly, in Walker v. Butterworth,6 ' the court held that the
defendant's compulsory personal exercise of his preemptory chal-
lenges to the jury, which the prosecutor subsequently used as evidence
of the defendant's sanity, violated his privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. Although in that case the defendant actually did speak words,
it was not the words themselves-"I am [or am not] content with this
juror"-which were incriminating, but rather, the testimonial infer-
ence to be drawn from them: "I am presently sane [and arguably
therefore sane at the time of the offense] because I am able to person-
ally exercise my right to challenge these prospective jurors." '161
In the case of the defendant who is medicated with psychotropic
drugs, the effect of the drugs is to communicate to the jury the defend-
ant's apparent mental processes, even if he does not utter a word.
Throughout the course of a lengthy insanity trial, the jury will have
numerous opportunities to observe the defendant's reactions to testi-
mony concerning the crime and his participation therein, and will
develop a picture of the defendant's mental state at the time of the
offense just as surely as if the state compelled the defendant to take
the stand and testify directly about his thought processes. The state
cannot do this without running afoul of the privilege against self-
incrimination. 162
The second vice of the compulsory administration of psycho-
tropic drugs to the defendant inheres in the great unreliability of the
demeanor which it creates. The forcible extraction of a confession
from the accused during the Inquisition was objectionable not only
because the state was compelling the accused to make a statement
against his will, but also because the veracity of a statement made
under such circumstances was suspect. 63 The statement made about
159. Id. at 347-48, 497 P.2d at 1022. In People v. Ramirez, a defendant challenged the
constitutionality of a roadside sobriety check point. 199 Colo. 367, 609 P.2d 616 (1980) (en
banc). The Supreme Court of Colorado clarified the holding in Serratore, stating that the
primary concern in that case was preventing prejudice that might result from compelled
communicative acts performed before the jury, and that this concern is not present outside of
the courtroom. Id. at 375 n.9, 609 P.2d at 621 n.9.
160. 599 F.2d 1074, 1083-84 (1st Cir. 1979).
161. Id. at 1084. The court emphasized that the prosecutor's comments at trial insured that
the defendant's utterances would convey the message of his sanity to the jury. Id.
162. See Serratore v. People, 178 Colo. 341, 497 P.2d 1018 (1972).
163. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 47 (1966).
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the defendant's sanity by his compulsory psychotropic medication is
equally suspect in its accuracy. The cool, calm demeanor and appar-
ent rationality that is superimposed on the defendant by the adminis-
tration of antipsychotic drugs stands in marked contrast to the
turbulent, disordered, and often violent thought processes that would
be communicated to the jury if he were not medicated. Thus, the com-
pulsory medication of the defendant undermines a fundamental goal
of the adversary trial process: to ascertain the truth. Because the
state has no interest in obtaining a resolution of a case that is inconsis-
tent with the truth, 64 it is highly inappropriate for it to achieve an
inaccurate resolution of the question of the defendant's sanity by
offering the persuasive but unreliable evidence of the defendant's
altered trial demeanor.
The fifth amendment stands as an important bulwark between
the individual and the state. It was aimed at ensuring that in the
contest between the government and the citizen, the government
shoulder the entire load. The forcible administration of psychotropic
drugs to the insanity defendant, which compels him to communicate
misleading and inaccurate information concerning his sanity to the
jury, undermines the presumption of innocence with which he must
be clothed at the beginning of trial as a matter of due process, and
allows the state to more easily make its case against him through the
cruel device of proving his sanity from his own demeanor.
C. The Denial of the Defendant's Constitutional and Common Law
Privacy Rights
The forcible medication of the insanity defendant in order to
render him "competent" to stand trial also violates his common law
and constitutional rights to be free from nonconsensual invasions of
his bodily integrity. Specifically, such compulsory medication consti-
tutes the tort of battery-an intentional touching without con-
sent"'65-and is also an independent violation of the tort principle that
an individual must give his "informed consent" before receiving non-
emergency medical treatment. 66 In addition, in a number of recent
decisions, both state and federal courts have recognized that state
compelled medication of the mentally ill violates their constitutional
right to privacy 67 as well as their first amendment rights of freedom
164. Ake v. Oklahoma, 105 S. Ct. 1087, 1095 (1985).
165. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 39-40 (W. Keeton ed. 1984); Stone,
The Right to Refuse Treatment: Why Psychiatrists Should and Can Make It Work, 38
ARCHIVEs GEN. PSYCHIATRY 358 (1981).
166. Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 931 (N.D. Ohio 1980).
167. See, e.g., Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded, 458
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of expression and religion. 68
The tort of battery is of ancient origin. In the thirteenth century,
English law recognized nonconsensual touching as a form of harm
compensable through the writ of trespass vi et armis.' 69 This tort
evolved over the next several centuries into what we today call "bat-
tery," and is aimed at the protection and vindication of the individ-
ual's interest in his own bodily integrity. 170
In the last twenty-five years, the related tort doctrine of informed
consent has developed into a principle which protects not only the
interest in bodily integrity, but also the individual's interest in making
his own choices about the most desirable course of medical treat-
ment. 171 Violation of this principle in the context of nonemergency
medical treatment will give rise either to a cause of action for battery,
if the failure to obtain informed consent was intentional, or negligent
medical malpractice, if the failure to obtain such consent was negli-
gent. 172 In order for the patient's consent to be deemed informed, it
must be knowledgeable, competent, 173 and voluntary. ' 74 The require-
U.S. 1119 (1982), on remand, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983); Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650 (1st
Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded sub. noma. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982), on remand,
Rogers v. Okin, 738 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1984); In re Boyd, 403 A.2d 744 (D.C. 1979); In re Richard
Roe III, 383 Mass. 415, 421 N.E.2d 40 (1981).
168. Boyd, 403 A.2d at 748.
169. Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 930 (N.D. Ohio 1980).
170. Id.; PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 165, at 39-40.
171. Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 931-32 (N.D. Ohio 1980).
172. Id. at 931.
173. Rivers of ink have been spent debating just what competency is. This is manifestly a
question of great import when the person attempting to assert a right to give informed consent
to a proposed course of psychiatric treatment is either alleged to be mentally ill or has been
civilly committed. In a seminal article, Professors Roth, Meisel, and Lidz suggest four tests
for competency, ranging from "evidencing a choice" to "the ability to understand," which
might be applied in evaluating whether an individual is capable of giving informed consent to a
proposed treatment. Roth, Meisel, & Lidz, Test of Competency to Consent to Treatment, 134
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 279, 280 (1979). Empirical data cannot demonstrate which of these tests
is the "best" or "most accurate" standard for determining competence to make treatment
decisions, including a decision to refuse treatment. Rather, each reflects a fundamental value
judgment about the deference which should be given to personal choice and medical opinion.
As Laurence Tancredi noted:
Competency, a legal concept, is viewed differently by the various professions
involved in the care of mental patients. The physician or psychiatrist operates
under the assumption that the mere existence of disease or illness requires
treatment whenever possible. Hence, there is a philosophical or value bias in the
direction of questioning the competency of an individual who would not want to
treat his disease conditions. From the viewpoint of the legal profession,
competency is more a mental process ....
... Tests of competency have been devised, though they seem to provide
minimal assistance for establishing the appropriate level for an individual to
enter into a meaningful informed consent .... Each of these tests is used to
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ment of informed consent reflects a fundamental belief that the indi-
vidual who will be affected by a proposed course of treatment must be
able, not only to weigh the risks and benefits of that treatment, but
also to decide for himself whether it is a treatment that he wishes to
undergo:17 5
The very foundation of the doctrine of [informed consent] is every
man's right to forego treatment or even cure if it entails what for
him are intolerable consequences or risks, however warped or per-
verted his sense of values may be in the eyes of the medical profes-
sion, or even of the community, so long as any distortion falls short
of what the law regards as incompetency. Individual freedom here
is guaranteed only if people are given the right to make choices
which would generally be regarded as foolish. 176
This same interest in being free from compelled intrusions on
bodily integrity and in having a sphere of personal autonomy within
which to make choices for oneself has been given constitutional signif-
icance in several Supreme Court decisions involving the constitutional
right to privacy. 177 Drawing variously upon the first amendment's
protections of freedom of thought, expression, and religion, the
justify decisions based on a cost/benefit analysis or trade-off of the treatments
being proposed as they balance against the individual's rights that are affected.
Tancredi, The Rights of Mental Patients: Weighing The Interests, 5 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y &
L. 199, 200-01 (1980).
174. Rhoden, supra note 103. Informed consent necessarily excludes any choice obtained
through "undue inducement . . . [including] force, fraud, deceit, duress, or other forms of
constraint or coercion." GREENWALD, INFORMED CONSENT, in HUMAN SUBJECTS
RESEARCH: A HANDBOOK FOR INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS 79 (1982). In the research
context, he identified the following criteria as critical in securing informed consent:
1. A fair and complete explanation of the procedures to be followed and
their purposes, including identification of any procedures that are experimental.
2. A complete description of any attendant discomfort and risk reasonably
to be expected.
3. A full description of any benefits reasonably to be expected.
4. A complete disclosure of any appropriate alternative procedure that
might be advantageous for the subject.
5. An offer to answer inquiries concerning the procedures, risks, benefits,
and any matter concerning the research and patient's treatment.
6. An assurance that the person is free to withdraw his consent at any time
and to discontinue participation in the project or activity without prejudice to his
care or treatment.
Id. at 81-82.
175. Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 932 (N.D. Ohio 1980); Macklin, Some Problems
in Gaining Informed Consent from Psychiatric Patients, 31 EMORY L.J. 345, 349-50 (1982);
Rhoden, supra note 103, at 382-83.
176. Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. at 932 (quoting 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW
OF TORTS 61 (Supp. 1968)).
177. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557,
564 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1964).
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fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures, the ninth amendment's penumbra of rights, and the four-
teenth amendment's due process protection of liberty and autonomy,
the Court has declared that a fundamental constitutional right to pri-
vacy does exist. The state may only infringe upon this right if neces-
sary to serve a compelling state interest.1
7 8
In recent years, a number of federal and state courts have found
this constitutional right to privacy to specifically encompass the right
of the mentally ill, both institutionalized and noninstitutionalized, to
refuse unwanted medical treatment, including treatment with psycho-
tropic drugs. In two landmark cases, federal appellate courts found
that the institutionalized mentally ill had a constitutional right to
refuse treatment, although the courts differed as to the means of
implementing that right. In Rogers v. Okin, 17 9 the Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit found that institutionalized mental patients in
Massachusetts had the right to refuse unwanted psychiatric treat-
ment, specifically the forcible administration of psychotropic drugs.1 8 1
The majority held that this right could be overcome only by the
state's need to respond to an emergency, defined as a situation requir-
ing action to prevent injury to the patient or others or in which the
patient's health would significantly deteriorate without such
medication. 18
In Rennie v. Klein," 2 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
also held that institutionalized mental patients had a constitutional
right to refuse antipsychotic drugs. The state might override this
right in order to prevent injury to the patient or others,8 3 but only by
means that represented the least restrictive alternative possible"8 4 and
that comported with the requirements of procedural due process."15
The court found that the administrative procedures that New Jersey
had established for its mental patients were sufficient to meet mini-
mum standards of procedural due process. These procedures pro-
vided first, for an informed discussion with the patient of the risks and
benefits of the proposed treatment, and then, if the patient refused the
treatment, serial review of the case by the patient's "treatment team,"
178. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 152-56.
179. 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded sub. nom. Mills v. Rogers, 457
U.S. 291 (1982).
180. Id. at 653.
181. Id. at 653-59.
182. 653 F.2d 836 (3rd Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982).
183. Id. at 838.
184. Id. at 845-47.
185. Id. at 848-52.
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the institution's director, and finally, by an outside psychiatrist. 8 6
In both Rogers and Rennie, the state appealed to the Supreme
Court and in both cases the Court remanded for further appellate
action.8 7 The Court remanded Rogers in light of the intervening
decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in In re Rich-
ard Roe 111,188 with an eye to a possible state law resolution of the
issue of a mental patient's right to refuse treatment. Rennie was
remanded in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Youngberg v.
Romeo, 8 9 which held inter alia that while an institutionalized men-
tally retarded person had a fourteenth amendment liberty interest in
being free from unreasonable bodily restraints, the test for determin-
ing whether the state had adequately safeguarded that right was
whether professional judgment had been exercised, with the judg-
ments of professionals being presumptively valid. 90
On remand, the court in Rogers v. Okin '91 placed heavy reliance
on the decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Rog-
ers v. Commissioner. 92 That court concluded, in response to the
court of appeals' questions regarding the scope of an institutionalized
mental patient's right to refuse treatment, that before a state may for-
cibly medicate a patient against his will, he must first be adjudicated
mentally incompetent to make a treatment decision, and second, be a
subject of a judicial proceeding to determine what the patient would
have chosen if he were competent. 93 If the court concluded in the
substituted judgment proceeding that this patient would, if compe-
tent, elect to receive psychotropic medication, then he could be so
treated. 94
In comparison, the court in Rennie v. Klein 191 held that while an
institutionalized mental patient did have a constitutional right to
refuse treatment, he could be forcibly medicated against his will if
medical professionals determined that such medication was necessary
in order for the patient to have a chance of improving his mental
186. Id.
187. See, e.g., Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded, 458
U.S. 1119 (1982), on remand, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983); Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650 (1st
Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded sub. nom. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982), on remand,
Rogers v. Okin, 738 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1984).
188. 383 Mass. 415, 421 N.E.2d 40 (1981).
189. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
190. Id. at 319, 322-24.
191. 738 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1984).
192. 390 Mass. 489, 458 N.E.2d 308 (1983).
193. Rogers v. Okin, 738 F.2d at 8.
194. Id. at 7.
195. 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983).
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condition.1 96 The court effectively reached the same result under
Youngberg v. Romeo as it had before, with the majority declaring that
the New Jersey administrative procedures satisfied the requirements
of procedural due process because they provided for the exercise of
professional judgment. 197
In contrast with the voluminous litigation raising the question of
the right of the institutionalized mentally ill to refuse treatment with
psychotropic medication, only a handful of cases, apart from those
discussing the synthetically sane insanity defendant, 98  have
addressed the question of whether a noninstitutionalized mentally ill
individual has a similar right. In those cases where this issue has been
raised, however, courts have decided unanimously in favor of the indi-
vidual's right to refuse treatment.
In In re Richard Roe III,199 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court held that in order for a noninstitutionalized individual to be
forced to accept psychotropic medication in the absence of an emer-
gency, he must first be adjudicated incompetent and then be the sub-
ject of a substituted judgment proceeding to determine whether he
would have accepted such treatment if he were in fact competent.2"
The court based its decision on the fundamental right to privacy,
which it found to have both constitutional and common law under-
pinnings, noting that such a right is "an expression of the sanctity of
individual free choice and self-determination as fundamental constitu-
ents of life."' 20 1 The court declared that "[a]bsent an overwhelming
State interest," both competent and incompetent individuals had the
right to refuse unwanted medical treatment.20 2 As a result, the court
refused to order the involuntary medication of Richard Roe, empha-
sizing the absence of an emergency, 20 3 the long-term adverse side
effects of psychotropic drug treatment,2° and the intrusiveness that
196. Id. at 269.
197. Id. at 269-70. Several members of the en banc panel interpreted Youngberg v. Romeo
as rejecting the least restrictive alternative analysis of the earlier Rennie decision. Id. at 268.
Other judges, however, did not so read Youngberg, and filed various opinions asserting the
correctness of the "least restrictive alternative" approach. Id. at 270 (Adams, J., concurring);
id. at 272 (Seitz, C.J., concurring).
198. See supra note 4. None of these cases have analyzed the right of a defendant to refuse
treatment.
199. 383 Mass. 415, 421 N.E.2d 40 (1981).
200. Id. at 417, 432-33, 421 N.E.2d at 50-51.
201. Id. at 433 n.9, 415 N.E.2d at 51 n.9 (quoting Superintendent of Belchertown State
School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 742, 370 N.E.2d 417, 426 (1977)).
202. Id. at 434-35, 421 N.E.2d at 51.
203. Id. at 440-42, 421 N.E.2d at 54-55.
204. Id. at 438-40, 421 N.E.2d at 53-54.
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such treatment involved.20 5 Further, the court stated that "[w]hile
the actual invasion involved in the administration of these drugs
amounts to no more than an injection, the impact of the chemicals
upon the brain is sufficient to undermine the foundations of personal-
ity," 2°6 and therefore, such treatment should not be permitted absent
a compelling state interest.
In Bee v. Greaves,2 °7 the court held that a schizophrenic pretrial
detainee, who had been forcibly medicated with thorazine in order to
prevent him from "decompensating" while awaiting trial, had a con-
stitutional right to refuse such medication. The decision was
grounded both in the detainee's first amendment right to be free from
state interference with the production and communication of ideas
and in his fourteenth amendment right to privacy and right to be free
from bodily restraints. The court emphasized that the constitutional
right to privacy encompassed "the right to make one's own decisions
about fundamental matters, the right to personal dignity and bodily
integrity, and the right to communicate ideas freely. ' 20 8 The court
also noted the serious potential side effects of antipsychotic drugs, and
drew upon the Supreme Court's decision in Youngberg v. Romeo209
reasoning that "[i]f incarcerated individuals retain a liberty interest in
freedom from bodily restraints of the kind in Romeo then a fortiori
they have a liberty interest in freedom from physical and mental
restraint of the kind potentially imposed by antipsychotic drugs. 210
Finally, the court declared that in order to medicate a pretrial
detainee against his will, the state must demonstrate a compelling
state interest in such medication and show that that interest cannot be
satisfied through less intrusive means. The court, recognizing that the
Supreme Court had rejected a less intrusive means approach in
Youngberg v. Romeo, distinguished that case on two grounds. First,
the restraints in Romeo were only temporary, while the restraints
that psychotropic drugs impose could be permanent. Second,
although Romeo was institutionalized after a judicial proceeding in
which he was declared severely retarded and unable to care for him-
self, in this case the pretrial detainee had not been adjudicated incom-
petent to make a treatment decision.21'
There are compelling reasons why, in the case of an insanity
205. Id. at 436-38, 421 N.E.2d at 52-53.
206. Id. at 437, 421 N.E.2d at 53.
207. 744 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1187 (1985).
208. Id. at 1391.
209. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
210. Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1393 (10th Cir. 1984) (latter emphasis added).
211. Id. at 1396 n.7.
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defendant asserting his constitutional right to privacy and his com-
mon law rights to be free from battery and to give informed consent
to medical treatment, these rights must be respected. Foremost
among these reasons is that psychotropic drugs are extremely power-
ful. They are specifically designed to cause significant changes in the
recipient's mental processes and often result in a number of uncom-
fortable, undesired, and irreversible side effects, including extremes of
activity levels, a misleading, wooden demeanor, and tardive dyskine-
212sia. 2 Both the defendant's interest in refusing nonconsensual inva-
sions of his bodily integrity and in making his own decisions about
what happens to his body support his right to reject the forcible
administration of psychotropic drugs as a precondition to standing
trial.
The recent decision of the Supreme Court in Winston v. Lee, 213
as well as the decisions in Rennie, Rogers, Richard Roe III, and Bee,
support this conclusion. In Winston, the Court held that proposed
surgery on a defendant to remove a bullet which the victim of his
crime allegedly fired was an unreasonable search and seizure, violative
of the fourth and fourteenth amendments, even though the state had
probable cause to perform the search. 214 The Court stressed that
"[t]he overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect
personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the
State, ' " concluding that given the magnitude of the proposed surgi-
cal invasion and its potential health risks, the state had not made out
a compelling case for the surgery. The Court declared that to author-
ize this surgery would permit the state to "'drug this citizen-not yet
convicted of a criminal offense-with narcotics and barbituates into a
state of unconsciousness' . . . and then search beneath his skin for
evidence of a crime," forcing the defendant to totally abdicate control
over his body.2" 6 The Court also found that the state had not con-
vincingly established a need for the bullet in order to successfully
prosecute the defendant, noting that the very facts which were suffi-
cient to establish probable cause for the surgical search and seizure
constituted substantial independent evidence of the defendant's guilt.
Additionally, the Court found that there was some doubt about the
bullet's reliability as evidence even if it were removed. 21 7
The forcible medication of the insanity defendant during trial in
212. See supra text accompanying notes 97-104.
213. 105 S. Ct. 1611 (1985).
214. Id. at 1616.
215. Id. (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966)).
216. Id. at 1619.
217. Id. at 1619 n.10.
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order to insure his "competence" shows a striking parallel to Winston
in terms of its invasiveness, risk, and lack of justification. Because the
defendant is not institutionalized, there is no state interest in main-
taining order and protecting other individuals from possible violence
from the defendant-the justification most commonly offered as
necessitating the forcible administration of drugs to institutionalized
patients. While it may be necessary in some cases to medicate the
defendant in order to insure decorum in the courtroom, such medica-
tion should take place, if at all, only if the actual behavior of the
defendant during trial compels such action.218 Further, if there has
been no adjudication of incompetency to make treatment decisions,
there are in fact no grounds to deprive the defendant of his right to
make the decision to accept or reject the medication himself. Nor can
there be any "treatment" rationale advanced to justify his forcible
medication, because the defendant has not been adjudicated incompe-
tent or civilly committed.
Finally, the defendant has important countervailing interests at
stake: his due process right to present a defense to the criminal
charge against him and his fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. The protection of these rights is vital to his presenta-
tion of an insanity defense and to the jury's ability to comprehend and
appreciate the merits of that defense. As the state has no interest in
an inaccurate resolution of the insanity issue, it has no interest in
insisting on the defendant's forcible medication, which can only lead
to a misleading view of his mental state at the time of the offense.
Considering all these circumstances, the defendant's common law and
constitutional interests in refusing unwanted medical treatment must
be held to outweigh the state's interest in insisting on his medication
as the price of standing trial.
D. Waiver of the Defendant's Right to be
Tried While Competent
While the principle of fundamental fairness incorporated within
the due process clause protects a defendant from being tried while
incompetent, this same notion of fundamental fairness must also per-
mit the defendant to waive his right if he concludes that it is in his
interest to do so. The courts have long recognized that a criminal
defendant can waive a number of his constitutional rights, both before
and during trial, as long as that waiver is knowing and intelligent219
218. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 347 (1970); Winick, Restructuring Competency to
Stand Trial, 32 UCLA L. REV. 921, 953-54 (1985).
219. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
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and made with adequate awareness of its consequences. 220 Thus, the
defendant may waive his privilege against self-incrimination, 2 1 his
right to counsel,2 22 his right to be present at trial, 223 his right to jury
trial, 224 his right to confront the witnesses against him,225 his right to
a speedy trial,226 and his right to present an insanity defense.227
The reasons for permitting waiver are twofold. First, the courts
allow waiver because it may be tactically advantageous to the defend-
ant. Second, waiver of fundamental constitutional rights is permitted,
and indeed, mandated under certain circumstances, out of " 'that
respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law.' ",228 The
numerous constitutional protections and safeguards afforded a crimi-
nal defendant are necessary to ensure that he receives the fairest possi-
ble adjudication of his guilt or innocence.2 29 These defense tools are
only provided to enhance the defendant's chances of successfully
answering a criminal charge, not to circumscribe his choices about the
best available means of conducting his defense. 230 As the Supreme
Court stated:
"What were contrived as protections for the accused should not be
turned into fetters .... When the administration of the criminal
law.., is hedged about as it is by the Constitutional safeguards for
the protection of the accused, to deny him in the exercise of his free
choice the right to dispense with some of these safeguards .. , is to
imprison a man in his privileges and call it the Constitution.",231
Thus, waiver is generally permitted when it will allow the
defendant to achieve a desired litigation end. For example, in order
for a defendant to plead guilty rather than go to trial, he must waive
his right to jury trial, his right to confront the witnesses against him,
220. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).
221. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
222. The defendant may waive his right to any counsel at all, or his right to conflict-free
counsel. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975); United States v. Armedo-Sarmiento, 524
F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1975).
223. Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17, 19 (1973); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 342-43
(1970).
224. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969). But see Singer v. United States, 380
U.S. 24, 26, 34-38 (1965) (holding that a defendant has no constitutional right to waive a jury
trial, and that the judge and prosecutor must concur in the defendant's waiver).
225. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243.
226. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
227. United States v. Frendak, 408 A.2d 364 (D.C. 1979).
228. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975) (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337,
350-51 (1969) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
229. Id. at 820.
230. Id. at 815, 818, 820.
231. Id. at 815 (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279-80
(1942)).
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and his privilege against self-incrimination.21 2  The courts allow
waiver because the defendant may then achieve a result that he
desires: the certainty of a lesser sentence in exchange for the
unknown results of a jury trial.233 Similarly, a defendant may waive
the right to present an insanity defense if she prefers a finite prison
sentence to the stigma of an acquittal on grounds of insanity and its
accompanying potentially indefinite commitment to a mental
hospital. 3
Waiver must also be permitted out of the same respect for indi-
vidual autonomy and freedom of choice that underlies the right to
refuse treatment: the axiomatic notion that each person is ultimately
responsible for choosing his own fate, including his position before the
law.23 1 This principle was reflected in the decision in Faretta v. Cali-
fornia,236 that all criminal defendants may waive their constitutional
right to counsel, even though the assistance of counsel usually
enhances a defendant's chances of being acquitted.237 In Faretta, the
Supreme Court noted, "implicit ... in the Sixth Amendment's guar-
antee of a right to the assistance of counsel, is 'the right of the accused
personally to manage and conduct his own defense in a criminal
case,' ",238 and held that, "[t]o thrust counsel upon the accused,
against his considered wish . . .violates the logic of the [Sixth]
Amendment. ' 239 Because it is the "defendant, and not the lawyer or
the State, [who] will bear the personal consequences of a conviction,
[i]t is the defendant, therefore, who must be free personally to decide
whether in his particular case counsel is to his advantage.
240
Courts have applied the reasoning of Faretta in cases where a
defendant wished to waive his right to conflict-free counsel, out of a
belief that a particular lawyer, even with a possible conflict of interest,
was more advantageous to his defense. 24' This reasoning has also
supported a decision in a case in which the defendant wished to waive
232. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243.
233. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742,
748 (1970). For an extensive discussion of the merits and shortcomings of plea bargaining, see
Altschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 652 (1981); Schulhofer,
Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1037 (1984).
234. United States v. Frendak, 408 A.2d 364, 376-77 (D.C. 1979).
235. Chapman v. United States, 553 F.2d 886, 891 (5th Cir. 1977).
236. 422 U.S. 806 (1974).
237. Id. at 832-34; see also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1962).
238. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 817 (quoting United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271, 274 (2d Cir.
1964) (emphasis added)).
239. Id. at 820.
240. Id. at 834.
241. United States v. Armedo-Sarmiento, 524 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v.
Garcia, 517 F.2d 272 (5th Cir. 1975).
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her right to present an insanity defense, even though that defense was
likely to be successful on the merits.242 Each of these decisions, like
Faretta, reflects a belief that in order to fully implement a criminal
defendant's basic right to present and manage his own defense, 24 3 he
must be permitted to waive a constitutional right designed for his pro-
tection. The state may not, by acting with the defendant's purported
"best interests" in mind, object to such a waiver.'"
In order to be upheld, a waiver of a federal constitutional right
must reflect an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known right.245 Further, to insure that a waiver is knowingly and
intelligently made, it must be done with sufficient awareness of the
relevant circumstances.246 In practice, this requires active judicial
involvement, and a comprehensive and penetrating questioning of the
defendant. This insures that his decision to waive a constitutional
right has been carefully considered and freely made, with full aware-
ness of the possible consequences.247 At least one court has suggested
following a procedure analogous to that mandated by Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 11, governing the taking of guilty pleas, in order
that the court may satisfy itself that the waiver is indeed knowing and
voluntary.24
242. United States v. Frendak, 408 A.2d 364, 378 (D.C. 1979). The District of Columbia is
one of the few jurisdictions in the United States in which trial courts have a duty to raise the
insanity defense sua sponte when it appears appropriate under the particular facts of a case.
243. Armedo-Sarmiento, 524 F.2d at 592-93.
244. Garcia, 517 F.2d at 276-77.
245. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 439 (1963); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
246. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).
247. Garcia, 517 F.2d at 277-78; Frendak, 408 A.2d at 380.
248. Garcia, 517 F.2d at 278. The Supreme Court's decision in Von Moltkee v. Gillies
supports this conclusion. 332 U.S. 708 (1948). In Von Moltkee, the defendant, a German
citizen charged with espionage during World War II, was held incommunicado for more than
six weeks before she pleaded guilty. The Court held that before the defendant could waive her
right to counsel, the trial court was required to undertake a searching and comprehensive
examination in order to insure that the defendant understood the nature and consequences of
her action. The Court held:
[I]n light of the strong presumption against waiver of the constitutional right to
counsel, a judge must investigate as long and as thoroughly as the circumstances
of the case before him demand. The fact that an accused may tell him that he is
informed of his right to counsel and desires to waive this right does not
automatically end the judge's responsibility. To be valid such waiver must be
made with an apprehension of the nature of the charges, the statutory offenses
included within them, the range of allowable punishments thereunder, possible
defenses to the charges and circumstances in mitigation thereof, and all other
facts essential to a broad understanding of the whole matter. A judge can make
certain that an accused's professed waiver of counsel is understandingly and
wisely made only from a penetrating and comprehensive examination of all the
circumstances under which such a plea is tendered.
Id. at 723-24.
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Only a few courts have addressed the question of whether a
defendant may waive his right to be tried while competent, although a
number of commentators have suggested that such a course is often
appropriate. In People ex rel. Myers v. Briggs,2 49 the Illinois Supreme
Court held that an illiterate deaf-mute defendant, who had been com-
mitted as incompetent to stand trial, must be given an opportunity to
be tried, despite his handicaps, to avoid what would otherwise be a
lifetime confinement due to his incompetence. The court held that the
defendant's deficiencies in fitness for trial should be accommodated as
would those of any other handicapped defendant. Accordingly, the
court should afford the defendant "such ... reasonable facilities for
confronting and cross-examining the witnesses as the circumstances
will permit .... The fact of blindness or deafness of the accused may
lessen the ability and capacity of the defendant to utilize his constitu-
tional rights, but this will not prevent his being subject to trial. 250
In a more limited decision, in State v. McCredden,z5 1 the Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court held that before a defendant could be adjudicated
incompetent to stand trial, he must be afforded a hearing to determine
whether it was probable that he had committed the crime charged.
At such a hearing, he must be represented by counsel, who would
cross-examine prosecution witnesses and call witnesses on his
behalf.252 Similarly, in Jackson v. Indiana,253 the Supreme Court of
the United States suggested that an incompetent defendant could at
least litigate certain issues even if he could not be deemed an appro-
priate subject for trial. The Jackson Court did not read the "Court's
previous decisions to preclude the States from allowing, at a mini-
mum, an incompetent defendant to raise certain defenses such as
insufficiency of the indictment, or to make certain pretrial motions
through counsel. 254
Most recently, in State v. Hayes,255 the New Hampshire Supreme
Court held that a defendant, who was competent to stand trial only
when taking psychotropic drugs, could waive his right not to be tried
while incompetent. Such a waiver would require a careful explana-
tion to the defendant of this right, and the consequences of its waiver,
while he was synthetically competent. 25 6  In Commonwealth v.
249. 46 Ill. 2d 281, 263 N.E.2d 109 (1970).
250. Id. at 287, 263 N.E.2d at 113.
251. 33 Wis. 2d 661, 148 N.W.2d 33 (1967).
252. Id. at 669, 148 N.W.2d at 37-38.
253. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 741 (1972).
254. Id.; see also Winick, supra note 218, at 968-69.
255. 111 N.H. 458, 389 A.2d 1379 (1978).
256. The court stated:
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Louraine,2 " the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court endorsed the
Hayes decision, specifically holding that a defendant can waive his
right to be tried while competent.258
A number of commentators have suggested that, at a minimum,
an incompetent defendant ought to be able to insist on a limited adju-
dication of legal issues that do not require his active participation. 9
These would include jurisdictional and speedy trial issues,260 ques-
tions regarding search and seizure and the admissibility of confes-
sions, and other issues of a strictly legal nature. In addition, there
may be other issues, such as erroneous identification, that could be
fully litigated without the defendant's assistance.26' Such a procedure
for limited adjudication would often resolve, in the defendant's favor,
the question of whether he can be held for trial, and would prevent his
indeterminate commitment as incompetent.262 Both the ABA Stan-
dards for Criminal Justice and the Model Penal Code have endorsed
such procedures. Model Penal Code section 4.06(3) provides that
"[t]he fact that the defendant is unable to proceed does not preclude
any legal objection to the prosecution which is susceptible of fair
determination prior to trial and without the personal participation of
the defendant. 2 63 Similarly, ABA Standard for Criminal Justice 7-
4.12 declares: "The fact that the defendant has been determined to be
incompetent to stand trial should not preclude further judicial action,
defense motions or discovery proceedings which may fairly be con-
If the defendant by his own voluntary choice, made while competent, becomes
incompetent to stand trial because he withdraws from the medication, he may be
deemed to have waived his right to be tried while competent.... The trial court
should however carefully examine the defendant on the record, while competent,
to establish the following: that the defendant understands that if he is taken off
the psychotropic medication he may become legally incompetent to stand trial;
that he understands that he has a constitutional right not to be tried while legally
incompetent; that the defendant voluntarily gives up this right by requesting that
he be taken off the psychotropic medication; and that he understands that the
trial will continue whatever his condition may be.
Id. at 462-63, 389 A.2d at 1382.
257. 390 Mass. 28, 453 N.E.2d 437 (1983).
258. Id. at 38, 453 N.E.2d at 437.
259. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 404(a) (1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1001(b) (1983);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-23-440 (Law. Co-op. 1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.77.090(1)
(1980); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 971.13(3), 971.14(l)(c) (1985).
260. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-23-440 (Law. Co-op. 1985).
261. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.06(3) (Proposed Official Draft 1962); Foote, supra note 13,
at 841; see infra note 268.
262. Foote, supra note 13, at 841-43, 845.
263. Id. at 841. Professor Foote suggested, "[i]n a robbery prosecution based on
identification evidence, for example, counsel may be able to establish from employment
records and the testimony of third parties that the defendant was at work in another city at the
time of the crime." Id.
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ducted without the personal participation of the defendant." 2" A few
states have followed the lead of the Model Penal Code and the ABA
Standards for Criminal Justice, and have enacted statutes permitting
some limited defense challenges to the prosecution case. 265 Of these
statutes, South Carolina's is the most sweeping, authorizing incompe-
tent defendants to offer a defense on the merits, except for an insanity
defense, in a court trial.266
Each of these approaches, although a step in the right direction,
is inadequate to protect the rights of an insanity defendant whom the
state insists will only be competent if maintained on psychotropic
264. Of course, after Jackson v. Indiana, the spectre of indefinite commitment of a
defendant found incompetent to stand trial ought to have faded. 406 U.S. 715 (1972). In
Jackson, the Supreme Court held that a severely retarded deaf-mute defendant could not be
indefinitely committed as incompetent to stand trial when it was highly unlikely that he could
ever beome competent and also unlikely that the state could successfully obtain his civil
commitment. Since Jackson, however, courts have upheld a number of lengthy commitments
of defendants said to be "progressing" toward competency. Brooks, supra note 29, at 381.
Further, a study in 1979 found that nearly one-half of the states continued to allow the lengthy
and indefinite commitment of incompetent defendants without periodic review of their present
capacity to stand trial. Winick, supra note 218, at 927, 940 (citing Roesch and Golding,
Treatment and Disposition of Defendants Found Incompetent to Stand Trial: A Review and a
Proposal, 2 INT'L. J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 349 (1979)).
265. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.06(3) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). The Code also
provides an alternative post-commitment hearing as a means of raising strictly legal objections
to the charges against a defendant, as follows:
Alternative: (3) At any time within ninety days after commitment as provided
in Subsection (2) of this Section, or at any later time with permission of the Court
granted for good cause, the defendant or his counsel or the Commissioner of
Mental Hygiene [Public Health or Correction] may apply for a special post-
commitment hearing. If the application is made by or on behalf of a defendant
not represented by counsel, he shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to
obtain counsel, and if he lacks funds to do so, counsel shall be assigned by the
Court. The application shall be granted only if counsel for the defendant satisfies
the Court by affidavit or otherwise that as an attorney he has reasonable grounds
for a good faith belief that his client has, on the facts and the law, a defense to the
charge other than mental disease or defect excluding responsibility.
(4) If the motion for a special post-commitment hearing is granted, the hearing
shall be by the Court without a jury. No evidence shall be offered at the hearing
by either party on the issue of mental disease or defect as a defense to, or in
mitigation of, the crime charged. After hearing, the Court may in an
appropriate case quash the indictment or other charge, or find it to be defective
or insufficient, or determine that it is not proved beyond a reasonable doubt by
the evidence, or otherwise terminate the proceedings on the evidence or the law.
In any such case, unless all defects in the proceedings are promptly cured, the
Court shall terminate the commitment ordered under Subsection (2) of this
Section and order the defendant to be discharged or, subject to the law governing
the civil commitment of persons suffering from mental disease or defect, order
the defendant to be committed to an appropriate institution of the Department of
Mental Hygiene [Public Health].
Id. at § 4.06(3), (4) (alternative provisions).
266. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 7-4.12 commentary (1984).
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medication throughout the trial. For such a defendant, it is critically
important that he be able to insist on being tried even if, due to mental
illness, he meets the traditional criteria of incompetence, because his
most successful defense is likely to be that he was not criminally
responsible at the time of the crime.26 7 Thus, as the courts held in
Hayes and Louraine,268 the insanity defendant must be permitted to
waive the due process protections that the prohibition against trying
an incompetent defendant encompasses, 269 and appear at trial in an
unmedicated state. This approach comports with the twin rationales
of Faretta and the other waiver of constitutional rights cases: first,
that a defendant has the constitutional right to personally manage and
conduct his defense because of our profound respect for individual
autonomy and freedom of choice, and second, that the various consti-
tutional protections are designed for the defendant's benefit, to make
him a more likely winner on the merits. Thus, if a defendant know-
ingly and intelligently chooses to give up the protections that a partic-
ular constitutional guarantee affords 27 -- for example, the right not to
be tried while incompetent-the state must respect that decision. Per-
mitting the insanity defendant to be tried in an unmedicated state
effectuates his constitutional right to personally manage and present
267. For various tests of lack of criminal responsibility, see supra note 106. It is important
for the defendant considering whether or not to raise an insanity defense to recognize that the
consequences of a successful assertion of that defense may be lifelong confinement. See United
States v. Jones, 463 U.S. 354, 368-70 (1983). Depending on the crime with which he is
charged, the defendant may be confined for a much shorter period if he elects not to raise an
insanity defense. Id. at 369. For a discussion of Jones, see Fentiman, supra note 6, at 612-13.
A defendant must be competent when he makes the decision to waive or assert an insanity
defense. See United States v. Frendak, 408 A.2d 364 (D.C. 1979).
268. See supra notes 255-58 and accompanying text.
269. But see Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 384 (1966). In Pate, the Supreme Court
declared that an incompetent defendant is unable to knowingly or intelligently waive his right
to have the trial court make a determination of his competency. The ABA adopted somewhat
uncritically the Pate rule, noting that "[tihe pragmatic consequences which result from a rule
of absolute nontriability [due to incompetence] are not entirely satisfactory. Nonetheless, the
standards adopt that position as constitutionally mandated." ABA STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 7-4.12 commentary (1984). In contrast, Bruce Winick has suggested that
the Court's statement in Pate is merely dicta because the state had conceded that "the
conviction of an accused person while he is legally incompetent violates due process," and
instead the Court was arguing that the defendant had waived the competency issue by failing
to request a hearing. Winick, supra note 218, at 968-69. Professor Winick argued:
[I]t was the denial of the defendant's right to a competency hearing that was the
focus of the holding in Pate. A procedural due process right to a determination
of competency is not the equivalent of a substantive due process right to be
immune from trial while incompetent, nor of a rule of law barring a defendant
from electing to go to trial even if his competency is impaired.
Id. at 968.
270. For a more detailed discussion of waiver, see infra text accompanying notes 275 and
315-16.
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his own defense, promotes the state's and the defendant's interest in
accuracy of adjudication by providing the jury with the most trust-
worthy picture of the defendant's mental state at the time of the
crime, and maximizes the defendant's right to self-determination and
personal autonomy, a hallmark of our legal system.
Further, to permit a mentally ill insanity defendant to be tried
without medication comports with the fundamental principles under-
lying the prohibition against trying an incompetent defendant. As
noted earlier,27" ' this proscription stemmed from both moral and legal
concerns for the defendant. It was believed to be inhumane and
unfair to try an individual who was incapable of understanding the
charges and proceedings against him. This defendant would be
severely handicapped in presenting a successful defense, and, if con-
victed, would not know why he was being punished. This concern
was well-founded because, at the time the incompetency doctrine was
developed, there was an absolute prohibition in many cases against
counsel representing a defendant. 2 Under these circumstances, it
was vitally necessary that the defendant be competent if he was to
have any chance of successfully meeting the state's case.273 But today,
with the insanity defendant represented by counsel, it is both feasible
and necessary for the defendant to be able to waive his right to be
tried while competent, in order to achieve his desired litigation end-
an acquittal by reason of insanity.
If such a waiver is to comport with due process, it might be
appropriate for the defendant to be medicated before trial,27 4 in order
to consult with his attorney as to significant facts and witnesses and
to otherwise map out trial strategy, and knowingly and intelligently
waive his right to be tried while competent.2 7 5 Then, at an appropri-
271. See supra text accompanying notes 13-28.
272. Winick, supra note 218, at 952.
273. Id. at 953.
274. This is so despite the disadvantages of cognitive dampening, depression, and a
diminished survival instinct adverted to previously. See supra text accompanying notes 120-
25. Medicating the defendant before trial permits him to maximize the benefits of
psychotropic medication in terms of his trial strategy, while taking him off medication during
trial permits him to receive the maximum benefits of nonmedication as well.
275. To ensure the protection of the incompetent defendant, such a waiver would have to be
on the record and follow a detailed colloquy between the defendant and the trial judge
regarding all possible consequences of the decision, including the range of punishments to
which the defendant could be subjected if convicted. See Commonwealth v. Lorraine, 390
Mass. 28, 453 N.E.2d 437 (1983); State v. Hayes, 118 N.H. 458, 389 A.2d 1379 (1978); supra
notes 249-252 and accompanying text; cf. United States v. Frendak, 408 A.2d 364, 380 (D.C.
1979) (stating that "the trial judge must conduct an inquiry designed to assure that the
defendant has been fully informed of the alternatives available, comprehends the consequences
of failing to assert the defense, and freely chooses to raise or waive [it]"); United States v.
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ate interval prior to trial, the defendant could elect to stop taking
psychotropic medication, 276 in order to minimize the long-term risk of
tardive dyskinesia and eliminate the other negative side effects of
these drugs, such as akinesia and akathisia, and thus present a
demeanor to the jury which accurately reflects his mental state at the
time of the offense.27 7 Such a defendant would be acting in accord-
ance with the essential purposes of the incompetency prohibition. He
would be able to function as a defendant in terms of active and com-
prehending pretrial preparation, and he would be able to understand
why he was charged and why he might be punished. He would be
able to recall pertinent facts, identify potential witnesses, and discuss
with his attorney alternative trial strategies. As a result, the defend-
ant would be able to persuasively mount the best defense available to
him-that he was insane at the time of the offense. Such a waiver
comports with the fundamental purpose of the incompetency prohibi-
tion-"promoting the accuracy of the factual guilt or innocence
determination. ' ' 278 At the same time, this waiver enables the defend-
ant to assert his constitutional rights to present a defense, to be free
from the invasion of his privacy occasioned by forcible medication
with psychotropic drugs, and to be free from compulsory self-
incrimination.
III. No COMPELLING STATE INTEREST JUSTIFIES THE
COMPULSORY MEDICATION OF THE INSANITY
DEFENDANT AS A CONDITION OF His
STANDING TRIAL
As has been demonstrated at length above, medication of an
insanity defendant in order to render him competent to stand trial
violates his due process right to present a defense, his fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, and his constitutional and com-
mon law rights to privacy and bodily integrity. Although the justifi-
cation advanced for compulsory medication of the insanity defendant
is the need for him to be competent to stand trial, this justification is
both unfounded and insufficient to outweigh the defendant's multiple
constitutional interests in being tried without drugs. This justification
is unfounded because it naively equates the medical determination of
mental illness with the legal judgment of incompetence, without
Garcia, 517 F.2d 272, 278 (5th Cir. 1975) (stating that "the district court should address each
defendant personally and forthrightly advise of potential danger").
276. The effects of psychotropic medication may be long-term; in some cases lasting as long
as several months. R. BALDESSARINI, supra note 103, at 23.
277. See supra text accompanying notes 93-126.
278. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 7-4.1 commentary (1984).
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examining why we believe it unjust to subject incompetent defendants
to trial. It is also insufficient because a number of societal interests
can only be advanced by permitting the defendant to be tried in an
unmedicated state.
Consideration of the competing interests of the state and the
insanity defendant regarding forcible medication must begin with an
examination of the nature of the constitutional guarantees that state-
compelled medication violates. Each of these-the right to present a
defense, the privilege against self-incrimination, and the right to pri-
vacy and bodily integrity-are fundamental constitutional rights,
whose infringement must be zealously guarded against, and thus,
may be overridden only by a compelling state interest.
The right to present a defense-to meet the state's case with the
best evidence available-is fundamental.279 Once the state has made
the insanity defense available to the defendant, placing his mental
state at issue, it is vitally important that the defendant be able to pro-
vide evidence of insanity, by offering his demeanor in an unmedicated
state. This is critical to demonstrate convincingly his delusions, hal-
lucinations, and lack of rationality and self-control. As the Supreme
Court stated in Ake v. Oklahoma, "a criminal trial is fundamentally
unfair if the [s]tate proceeds against an indigent defendant without
making certain that he has access to the raw materials integral to the
building of an effective defense. ' 280 Because the impact of the defend-
ant's demeanor pervades the entire trial and provides the context for
the jury's receipt of other evidence concerning his insanity defense, 28'
it is critical that the jury be able to see the insanity defendant while he
is not medicated.
Courts have seldom addressed the question of whether reversal is
automatically required when the state denies the defendant the right
to present a defense.2 82 Nevertheless, it seems reasonable that, at the
very least, a standard of harmless error28 3 ought to be applied.284
279. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 17-19 (1967).
280. Ake v. Oklahoma, 105 S. Ct. 1087, 1094 (1985).
281. See supra text accompanying notes 83-120.
282. For examples of cases in which the Supreme Court required reversal of the defendant's
conviction without any explanation of the standard used in determining the necessity for
reversal, see Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 298 (1973); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S.
14, 17-19 (1967).
283. In Chapman v. California, the Court held that "before a federal constitutional error
can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt." 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1966).
284. In United State ex rel. Enoch v. Lane, the court applied the "harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard of Chapman to determine the appropriate disposition of a case in
which the defendant was denied his right to present critical exculpatory evidence. 581 F. Supp.
423, 432 (N.D. Ill. 1984). The recent Supreme Court decision in Delaware v. Van Arsdall
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Involuntarily medicating an insanity defendant with psychotropic
drugs prevents him from offering critical evidence of his insanity at
the time of the offense,285 and thus, cannot be said to be harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Similarly, the multiple violations of the fifth amendment occa-
sioned by compelled medication of the insanity defendant are so seri-
ous that the state could advance no interest that would outweigh
them. There are at least two separate fifth amendment violations that
inhere in a state decision to compel the insanity defendant to be medi-
cated in order to stand trial. First, such medication and the altered
demeanor that accompanies it compel the defendant to be the instru-
ment of his own conviction, thus violating the privilege against self-
incrimination.28 6 Second, by effectively mandating the presentation of
this altered demeanor, the state considerably lightens its own burden
at trial, violating the fundamental precept of our adversarial system of
justice that the state must shoulder the entire burden of proving its
case against the individual.287 As one court stated:
The nature of our legal system has, at its heart, the adversary pro-
cess whereby the state and the defendant, by contending vigorously
but fairly against each other, are able to present the total factual
and legal issues from which a trier of fact may arrive at a decision.
When the state is allowed, during the time of trial, to administer
drugs to a defendant, contrary to his will, it is able to affect the
judgment and capacity of its own adversary.288
Further, such forcible medication undercuts the presumption of the
defendant's innocence, making it easier for the state to prove its case.
Although not all fifth amendment violations require automatic
reversal of the defendant's conviction, a coerced confession does,289
presumably because of the magnified harm occasioned by the com-
pelled extraction of a confession from a criminal suspect and the unre-
emphasized that violation of a sixth amendment right sometimes requires automatic reversal
and other times must be judged by the "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" standard. 105 S.
Ct. 1431, 1438 (1986) (holding that a violation of the sixth amendment's confrontation clause
must be judged by the "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" standard). In United States v.
Powell, however, the court held that where the government's policy on obtaining visas to visit
the Republic of China prevented defense counsel from travelling there to interview key
defense witnesses, the charges against the defendants would have to be dismissed. 156 F. Supp.
526, 531 (N.D. Cal. 1957).
285. See supra text accompanying notes 83-135.
286. See supra text accompanying notes 142-50.
287. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964); see also supra text
accompanying notes 141-152.
288. State v. Maryott, 6 Wash. App. 96, 98, 492 P.2d 239, 241 (1971).
289. Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 568 (1958).
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liability of such an admission of guilt.290 A strong argument can be
made that the compulsory medication of the insanity defendant suf-
fers from the same two vices because it involves the application of
state power to a person unwilling to assist the state in securing his
conviction and yields evidence that is extremely incriminating, but
unreliable. Even if a court judged this fifth amendment violation by
the lesser, harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, standard applied to
prosecutorial or judicial comment upon a defendant's failure to tes-
tify, 291 the fifth amendment violations involved here could never be
deemed harmless because of the significant impact the defendant's
chemically altered demeanor has on the jury's ability to fairly con-
sider his defense of insanity.
Finally, the state must also show a compelling interest before vio-
lating the defendant's fundamental right to privacy and the right to
autonomy in making decisions relating to one's bodily integrity,
292
particularly when these rights are accompanied, as here, by a first
amendment interest in freedom of expression. 293 Forcible administra-
tion of psychotropic medication unquestionably contravenes the indi-
vidual's right to privacy and autonomy in decision-making, his
freedom of expression at trial, and his common law right to be free
from battery and his right to insist on informed consent to nonemer-
gency medical treatment.294 Consequently, we must examine those
interests that the state might assert to outweigh these rights.
To counterbalance these fundamental defense interests, the state
can offer only two justifications. The first is the prohibition against
the trial of incompetent defendants and the second is the state's inter-
est in assuring that persons accused of committing a crime have the
question of their guilt or innocence adjudicated, and, if found guilty,
in punishing them appropriately. Forced psychotropic medication,
which results in violations of the insanity defendant's basic constitu-
tional liberties, is not necessitated by a concern for his incompetency,
nor does it advance the state's interest in bringing a suspected crimi-
nal to trial.
The prohibition against the trial of an incompetent defendant
was designed to achieve several socially desirable ends. First, it was
aimed at protecting the incompetent accused from the unfairness of
being tried in a condition in which he could not recall important facts,
290. Id.; In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 47 (1966).
291. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1966).
292. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154-55 (1973).
293. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963); In re Boyd, 403 A.2d 744, 748
(D.C. 1974).
294. See supra text accompanying notes 165-218.
1162
1986] PSYCHOTROPIC DR UGS - INSANITY DEFENSE
identify helpful witnesses, or otherwise work to mount the strongest
defense possible. The broad public interest in an accurate adjudica-
tion of the defendant's guilt required that he be given a meaningful
opportunity to plan and prepare a defense. Second, in accordance
with a basic concern for human dignity, the incompetency prohibition
was designed to ensure that the criminal trial was a rational exchange
between the accused and his community, rather than an empty ritual
in which the accused was a noncomprehending vegetable. Third, it
was important that if he was convicted, the accused understand why
he was being punished, so that the essential purposes of punishment-
retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation-could be accomplished. 295
In practice, the forcible medication of the insanity defendant in
order to render him "competent" does not achieve the goals of the
incompetency prohibition. First and foremost, it does not achieve an
accurate resolution of the issue of the defendant's criminal responsi-
bility. Psychotropic medication actually makes it much more likely
than if the defendant was unmedicated, that the trier of fact will reach
an inaccurate, incorrect conclusion as to the defendant's guilt or inno-
cence, 296 due to the misleading demeanor and lessened instinct for
self-preservation created by the drugs. Second, although the medi-
cated insanity defendant may appear to be calm, rational, and "nor-
mal," he may in fact be just as much a vegetable as a wildly raving
lunatic. The quiet zombie sitting in the courtroom may, because of the
debilitating and distracting side effects of psychotropic drugs, be
unable to comprehend and participate in the proceedings against him,
except in a superficial way. Third, although the forcibly medicated
insanity defendant may, if convicted, understand why he is being pun-
ished, the method of gaining that understanding is indeed cruel. If he
had been permitted to be tried in an unmedicated state, the defendant
probably would have been found not guilty by reason of insanity. The
consequence of such an insanity acquittal would most likely be a
short-term commitment for evaluation of his present mental state fol-
lowed, if deemed appropriate, by commitment to a state mental hospi-
tal for psychiatric treatment.297 In contrast, the forcibly medicated
insanity defendant is likely to be found guilty and sent to prison,
where he will receive little, if any, psychiatric treatment.298
Forcibly medicating an insanity defendant does not further the
295. See supra text accompanying notes 11-27; ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE
7-4.1 commentary (1984).
296. See supra text accompanying notes 93-119. A fourth goal of punishment,
incapacitation, is accomplished whether or not the defendant knows why he is being punished.
297. Id.
298. Fentiman, supra note 6, at 614.
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legitimate state interest in adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a per-
son accused of a criminal violation. Indeed, it is axiomatic that once
the defendant is brought to trial, both he and the state must have
access to all relevant evidence. 299 As the Supreme Court has declared:
"The ends of criminal justice would be defeated if judgments were to
be founded on a partial or speculative presentation of the facts. ' 3°
The state simply has no interest in an inaccurate determination of the
defendant's guilt or innocence, and therefore, may not legitimately
assert an interest in maintenance of a strategic advantage over the
defense, if the result of that advantage is to cast a pall on the accuracy
of the verdict obtained.3 10 This, however, is precisely what the com-
pulsory medication of a defendant with a meritorious defense of
insanity does, by inducing his misleading trial demeanor and a
decreased will to win at trial.
In contrast, the author's proposal that an insanity defendant be
permitted to waive his right to be tried while competent in order to
be free from medication during trial has much to recommend it. By
voluntarily receiving medication prior to trial, the defendant can in
fact meet the majority of criteria that psychiatrists working in the
area of competency suggest are essential to a defendant's ability to
function as a defendant.30 2 He can be educated as to the nature of
court proceedings and the role of the key players in those proceed-
299. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87
(1963).
300. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 709.
301. Ake v. Oklahoma, 105 S. Ct. 1087, 1095 (1985); see also United States v. Nixon, 418
U.S. at 709.
302. For two of the most widely recognized competency checklists, see Robey, Criteria For
Competence to Stand Trial: A Checklistfor Psychiatrists, 122 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 616 (1965);
LABORATORY OF COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY, supra note 33. The Commentary to the ABA
Standards for Criminal Justice also suggests five major aspects of the competency
determination:
1) The defendant should have a perception of the [trial] process which is not
distorted by mental illness or disability. ...
2) The defendant should have the capacity to maintain the attorney-client
relationship .... [including] the ability to discuss the facts of the case with the
attorney "without paranoid distrust", to advise and accept advice from the
attorney, to decide upon his plea and to approve the legal strategy of the trial ....
3) [The defendant must be] able to recall and to relate factual information ... to
reveal to his attorney exonerating circumstances ... [and] . .. to listen to
witnesses and to "inform his lawyer of distortions or misstatements."
4) [T]he defendant should have the necessary ability to testify in his own
defense, in the event that should be appropriate.
5) A final factor to be considered is the relationship of the defendant's abilities to
meet the criteria in the light of the particular charge, the extent of participation
required of the defendant and the complexity of the case.
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4.1 commentary (1984).
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ings-the defense attorney, prosecutor, judge, jurors, witnesses, and
the defendant himself, the specific charges against him, and the poten-
tial penalties if he is convicted, including the reasons why he would be
punished, as well as the alternative dispositions available if he were to
be acquitted on the grounds of insanity.30 3 A temporarily medicated
defendant can advise his attorney of potential exculpatory informa-
tion concerning his conduct and mental state at the time of the
offense, his past psychiatric history, and possible defense witnesses.
He can also consult with his attorney regarding alternative trial strat-
egies, including insanity and other defenses he might want to raise,
the option of testifying in his own behalf, and the possibility of waiv-
ing constitutional rights designed for his protection.3 °4
There are a few areas, however, in which such a defendant might
not be deemed competent if he later elected to be tried without
psychotropic medication. For instance, the defendant might encoun-
ter problems at trial if he attempted to challenge the testimony of
prosecution witnesses. He might have difficulty knowing if they were
lying or otherwise distorting the facts. Similarly, the defendant would
be limited in his ability to testify in his own behalf. In this latter case,
however, it might actually be advantageous to his defense of insanity
for him to be less than completely lucid, as long as the jury perceived
him as a truthful witness. Finally, there is always the possibility that
the unmedicated defendant will begin to decompensate at trial. It has
been suggested that this is a relatively minor risk,30 5 however, and one
which the judge can closely monitor during the course of the trial,
when the stresses of the trial experience can be more accurately
evaluated.3 °6
To permit an arguably incompetent insanity defendant to waive
his right to be tried only when competent is consistent with a number
of similar instances in which the state has insisted on the trial of such
a defendant, even though his competency to stand trial, in the sense of
having access to relevant evidence and being able to consult with his
attorney regarding the most appropriate trial strategy, was severely
impaired. Thus, the courts have often compelled a defendant to stand
trial even though he may be suffering from permanent amnesia con-
303. See supra note 302.
304. See Robey, supra note 302, at 621.
305. See Ennis & Hansen, Memorandum of Law: Competency to Stand Trial, in
COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL 491, 498.
306. Id.; see Winick, supra note 218, at 953-54; cf. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 179-81
(1975).
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cerning the events of the offense in question,3°7 or may have been so
drunk at the time of the alleged crime that he cannot recall anything
helpful to his defense,3 °8 or may be unable to locate a key witness.30 9
Similarly, even the constitutional right to a speedy trial,310 which is
aimed in part at "'limit[ing] the possibilities that long delay will
impair the ability of the accused to defend himself' ",311 due to a lack
of evidence, is not an absolute guarantee, but one that must be bal-
anced against the state's strong interest in having the defendant's
guilt or innocence adjudicated at some time.312
Thus, it is unreasonable to insist on the apparent absence of
mental illness as the sine qua non of competency to stand trial or to
require every criminal defendant to have a high degree of perform-
ance capacity.31 3 Simply put, competency is not a black or white phe-
nomenon. There are degrees of competency falling along a
continuum, and competency is almost always in flux. 314 Thus, even
when the defendant is suffering from mental illness, he ought to be
able to elect to be tried without psychotropic medication, after the
trial judge conducts a detailed and searching inquiry into the defend-
ant's awareness of what he is doing and his understanding of the con-
sequences of his actions.
Nothing less than a knowing and intelligent waiver can be
307. See, e.g., State v. McClendon, 103 Ariz. 105, 106-09, 437 P.2d 421, 422-25 (1968);
Parsons v. State, 275 A.2d 777, 786-89 (Del. 1971).
308. Note, supra note 14, at 457.
309. Burt & Morris, supra note 39, at 81-82.
310. The sixth amendment to the Constitution provides, in pertinent part: "in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy.., trial..." U.S. CONST. amend.
VI.
311. Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 378 (1969) (quoting United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S.
116, 120 (1968)).
312. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519 (1972).
313. Note, supra note 14, at 459.
314. Winick, supra note 218, at 966. As Professor Winick explains:
The differences between "crazy" and "normal" people are not as great as
commonly is supposed. Mentally ill people have a significant capacity for normal
and rational thought and behavior, and "normal" people frequently lose contact
with reality and lack the ability to think straight, to pay attention, to process
information, and to perform at least some key social tasks. Even in the midst of a
psychotic episode, mentally ill people function normally some of the time. ...
"Normal" defendants in our criminal courts frequently suffer from linguistic,
educational, and social problems that severely impair their ability to function
competently, particularly during the stress of a criminal trial or after a period of
oppressive pretrial incarceration.
In short, incompetent defendants are not very different from "normal"
defendants. All defendants tend to have difficulty understanding the nature of
the proceedings and assisting their counsel, and many defendants feel totally lost
in the "Alice in Wonderland" world of the criminal process.
Id. See also State v. Hayes, 118 N.H. 458, 389 A.2d 1379 (1978).
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accepted. It is important for the trial judge to establish, on the rec-
ord, that the defendant fully understands the import of his decision,
including its irrevocability.315 Thus, it would not do, as one commen-
tator has suggested, to permit counsel to waive the defendant's right
not be tried while incompetent.316 Such a procedure ignores the real-
ity of crowded criminal court calendars, overworked and underpaid
defense lawyers, and the pressures inherent in the attorney-client rela-
tionship on the defendant to accede to his counsel's suggestions.
More importantly, it would violate the defendant's right to autonomy
in decision-making. In order to fully protect this right, scrupulous
judicial scrutiny of the waiver decision is required, including a more
detailed inquiry than might normally be necessary for the waiver of a
constitutional right.317 Should the defendant become obviously and
seriously disturbed at trial, or engage in violent and disruptive behav-
ior, the court could then take steps to remedy the situation. One such
step could be to hold a midtrial competency evaluation, or perhaps
require the defendant to be excused from the courtroom,31 8 or even
declare a mistrial with the understanding that the state could try the
defendant again.31 9 Given the tiny fraction of criminal cases in which
the insanity defense is raised,32 ° this procedure would protect the
defendant's constitutional rights and insure a more accurate adjudica-
tion of his guilt or innocence, without seriously interfering with the
orderly administration of justice.
Permitting the insanity defendant to knowingly and intelligently
waive his right not to be tried while incompetent vindicates both his
fundamental constitutional rights and the legitimate interests of the
state in bringing an alleged criminal to account. Most significantly,
by choosing to forego psychotropic medication during trial, such a
defendant is assured a more accurate determination of his criminal
responsibility. Further, by taking these drugs prior to trial, a defend-
ant will be able to consult effectively with counsel regarding the fac-
315. Winick, supra note 218, at 970-71.
316. Id. at 951, 976-79.
317. See Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 (1948); supra text accompanying notes 239-
242.
318. See, e.g., Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
319. Winick, supra note 218, at 953 (citing Hamm v. Jabe, 706 F.2d 765, 767 (6th Cir.
1983)). In Hamm, the court held that there was a "manifest necessity" for a mistrial where a
defendant, who had been found "barely competent" to stand trial, suddenly, on the fourth day
of the proceedings, hurled a chair at the prosecutor. The court therefore found that the
defendant's retrial did not violate the constitional prohibition against double jeopardy, despite
the fact that the defendant had objected to the mistrial, and had urged that he merely be
excused from the courtroom for the remainder of the trial. Id.
320. See supra note 6.
1986] 1167
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:1109
tual and legal merits of his defense, and to plan effectively the trial
strategy most likely to be successful. Although he may not fully com-
prehend all aspects of his defense at the trial stage, he will at least
have been in a position prior to trial to understand the nature of the
proceedings against him. Medicating the insanity defendant prior to
trial also meets the historic concern of the incompetency prohibition,
that the defendant know why he is being charged and why he may be
punished, because his attorney may explain the likely alternative dis-
positions of his case while he is in a position to comprehend and eval-
uate them. Finally, this preserves respect for the dignity of the
individual, a primary goal of both the incompetency prohibition and
the constitutional rights of the defendant which would otherwise be
violated. It gives the defendant an opportunity to decide that it is in
his own best interest not to be medicated during the trial itself, while
also receiving the benefits of psychotropic drugs.
IV. CONCLUSION
The compulsory medication of a criminal defendant asserting an
insanity defense violates three major constitutional rights- his right
to privacy, his privilege against self-incrimination, and his right to
present and manage a defense to the charges against him. Similarly,
mandatory drug treatment violates his common law rights to be free
from battery and to give informed consent to all nonemergency medi-
cal treatment. Although these rights, and the values they seek to pro-
tect, might seem to be separate and discrete, they are, in truth, closely
related. Each of these constitutional rights reflects a judgment that in
our society great deference and respect must be given the individual.
Underlying each is a judgment in favor of personal autonomy-the
right to be let alone and the right to make one's own life decisions. As
they are applied in the criminal litigation context, each of these rights
reflects the importance of the state shouldering the entire burden in
its contest with the individual, of not allowing the state to use that
individual as the source of its case against him, of permitting the
defendant access to both the tools and the information he needs to
fight the state's case, and of letting him be the architect of his own
defense.
When the state insists on the medication of the insanity defend-
ant as a condition of his being "competent" to stand trial, each of
these goals is compromised. Such compulsory medication lightens
the state's evidentiary burden at trial, making it easier for the state to
rebut the defendant's contention that he was insane at the time of the
offense-by using the cruel device of using the defendant's own mind
1168
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and body as the vehicle for this rebuttal. This medication denies the
defendant the evidence he needs to demonstrate convincingly his
insanity, and deprives him of his right to be the master of his own
fate, violating the basic constitutional precept of deference to personal
autonomy. Neither the state's paternalistic desire to protect a men-
tally ill individual from the rigors of a trial that he may not fully
comprehend, nor the state's police power goal of insuring that all
those accused of a crime are properly held accountable for their
actions can justify the infringement of these fundamental liberties.
Accordingly, an insanity defendant must be able to waive his right not
to be tried while incompetent, and elect to proceed to trial without
psychotropic medication.
